Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Brett W. Nelson v. Jeff Jacobsen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsK.L. McIff; Attorney for RespondentCraig M. Snyder; Attorneys
for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nelson v. Jacobsen, No. 17667 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2628

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 17,667

JEFF JACOBSEN,
DefendantAppel lant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellant

K. L. McIFF

151 North Main Street

Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
JUL 15 1981
-------·--------- ----

..

·---------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum
andCourt,
LibraryUtah
Services
Clor~
S..preme
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRETT

\v. NELSON,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 17,667

JEFF JACOBSEN,
DefendantAppel lant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellant

K. L. McIFF
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • • • . . • . . . . . • .

l

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT . . . . • . . . . • • . • • . . . • • . . . . . . • .

l

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL..............................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • • • • . • . • • . • . . .

2

A.

Procedural Facts ••.•..•••••••.•••••••......•

2

B.

Substantive Facts •.••...•....••••••..•..••••

8

1.
2.
3.

Plaintiff Brett Nelson • . . . • . • • • . • • • . . • • •
Brenda Nelson Jacobsen •...•.•••.••.••••.
Defendant Jeff Jacobsen.................

ARGUMENT

9
22
24
29

POINT I . • • • • . • • . • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • •

29

PURSUANT TO ITS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET
AND DECLARE THE COMMON LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AND BASED UPON THE OVERWHELMING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED BELOW, THIS COURT SHOULD ABOLISH
AN ACTION AT LAW FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.
A. The Social And Domestic Assumptions
Upon Which An Action For Alienation Of
Affections Was Historically Predicated
Are No Longer Valid Or Persuasive Today....

30

B. Additional Public Policy Considerations
Militate In Favor Of Abolition of Alienation Actions And Substantially Outweigh
Any Benefits Gained By Preservation Of The
Action.....................................

34

c.

The Majority Of Jurisdictions In This
Country Have Abolished Actions At Law For
Recovery Of Money Damages For Alienation
Of Af feet ions. . . • • . . . • . . • . . • • . • • • • . • . . . • . • .

41

D.
This Court Has The Inherent Power To
Abolish The Tort Of Alienation of Affections.

45

POINT II .•••.•....••.. · ·. · • • • • • · · • • • • • • • • · • • • • • • •

49

THE TRIAL COURT'S ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY AND FINDINGS OF FACT ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
BY
THEby theEVIDENCE
PRESENTED
AT provided
TRIAL.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.
Plaintiff Failed To Sustain His Burden
Of Proving That Defendant Intentionally
And Wilfully Alienated Brenda's Affections
For Plaintiff...................................

51

B. The Trial Court's Award Of Compensatory
Damages Is Unsupported By The Evidence,
Excessive, And Was Based Upon Passion And
Prejudice.......................................

60

C. The Trial Court's Award Of Punitive
Damages Is Unsupported By The Evidence,
Excessive, And Was Based Upon Improper
Considerations. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • • . • . . . • . .

66

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL CONSTITUTED A MANIFEST ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Plaintiff's Failure To File With The
A.
Court And Serve Upon Defendant A Notice
To Appoint Another Attorney Or To Appear
In Person Operated To Deprive The Trial
Court Of Power To Proceed To Trial And
To Deprive Defendant Of Due Process Of
Law ..•.••.•.••.•.......•••••••••••••.....•..•...
B.
Defendant Was Not Afforded Adequate
And Timely Notice Of Trial And As A Result, Was Denied An Opportunity To Be
Heard In A Meaningful Way •..•.•..•••..•..••..••.
CONCLUSION ••••••••••...• , .••• , , •••.••..••• , .•..••••.•.••

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

73

TABLE Of CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Alaimo vs. Schwanz, 56 Wis. 2d 198, 201 N.W.2d 604 (1972) .•.

59

Bearbower vs. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978) ........•.•..

35

Cahoon 1.7.s. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959) •..••..•

31, 44,

Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952) . . • . • ••

72

Doe vs. Doe, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1412, 390 N.W.2d 730 (1979) .•

46

Dube vs. Rochette, 110 N.H. 129, 130, 262 A.2d 288, 289 (1970) 43
Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

37, 81

Elkington vs. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) . . . . • • . •• . • . . • ••

67, 68

Ernest w. Hahn, Inc. vs. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152
{Utah 1979) ••.•..•....•.•.......••.•..•••.•.••.•.•..•••••

45

Ferriter vs. Daniel O'Connell's Son, Inc., 80 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2075, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) .......•.•••.....•...••.••••••

43

Finley vs. Staton, 542 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1976) ..•••..••••••

85

fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981) .•.•••••

29, 32,
39, 40,
46, 47

Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .•...••••••••••

37, 81

Hardy vs. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972) •••

50

Heist vs. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 523 265 S.E.2d 434 (N.C.
App. 1980) ..••.•.•••..••••.•.••••••.•• · • • · • • · • • · • • • • • • • • •

44, 56,

Hemphill vs. Melton, 551 F.2d 589 (4th Cir. 1977) •••••.•••••

85

Hidden Meadows Development Co. vs. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1979) .••.....••.•.••...• •. • • • • · •• • • · · • • • • • · · · • •• • • •

49, 82

Hilton vs. Roylance, 25 Utah 129 69 P. 660 (1902) •••• · ..•.••

33

Holmes vs. Holdin, 615 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980) ......••....•.•

85

Hunt vs. Chang, 594 P.2d 118 (Hawaii 1979) ··•••·····•·•••···43, 52
Hyland vs. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d
72
736 (1967) ·•·•···•··••···•·•····••··•··•••·········•·•·••
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

Page
Jacobsen Construction Co. vs. Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980) . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

Kimball vs. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 7
( 1899) . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47, 48

King vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d
692 (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .

72

Logan vs. Davidson, 282 Ala. 327, 211 So.2d 461 (1968)

42

Long vs. Fischer, 210 Kan. 21, 499 P.2d 1063 (1972)

.

..•.

51, 52

Morrissey vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 68 Utah 323, 249 P.
1064 (1926) ...•.•.....•.••....••..•.•.•.•.•.........

33

Moulin vs. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927)

.

32, 43

Ohlausen vs. Brown, 572 So.2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 1979)

..

43

.

72

Paul vs. Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 261 P.2d 670 (1953)
Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31 (1928)

49
.

60, 61, r:,

.•.........

49, 50 / 1

Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976)
Rucker vs. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)

Rupp vs. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980)
Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278

....

(1956)

i

79

74

Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)

81

Skaggs vs. Stanton, 532 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1975)

•..•.•....

Stanton vs. Cox, 162 Miss. 438, 139 So. 438 (1932)
State vs. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P.2d 713 (1932)

43

..•..

57

•.....

33

Thompson vs. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302 (Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078
(1979) ~ . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 57' :,,
Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979)

•......•.....

34, 64

Uptown Appliance and Radio Co. vs. Flint, 122 Utah 298,
249 P.2d 826 (1952) ......••.......•..•.•.......... · ·

72

Utah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 25, 245
P. 381 (1926) ••...•.....•..........••.•.•..... · · · · · ·

53

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv

I

I
I

40, 44, h
48, 57

Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. West, 20 Utah 2d
292, 437 P.2d 214 (1968) •..•..•••..••.•••••.••••....
..•.•.••.•..•..•.

1

Utah Oil Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977)

..... .

74, 75, 76

Van Cott vs. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (1919)

73

Warner vs. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384, 163 S.E.2d 90
( 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

Wilson vs. Bryant, 167 Tenn. 107, 67 S.W.2d 133 (1933)

57

Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954)

9, 29, 44, .
47, 56, 58,
60 t 62 I 63 I
64, 65, 66,
67, 69' 70

Winsmore vs. Greenbank, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745)

30

...... .

Worrall vs. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah
1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .
Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980)

•.

Wyman vs. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976),
aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980) ......•..•.

33, 35, 42,
45 t 46
32, 35, 36,
37, 41, 45,
46

Ala. Code §6-5-331 (1977) ..•.••.••••.•••.•••••••••.••.••

42

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-341 (Supp. 1980-1981) . • . • . • •• •

41

Ark. Stat. Ann. §37-201 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979) . • .. • •

43

Cal. Civ. Code §43.5 (West 1954) ••••••••.•••.•••••••••.•

41

Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-20-202 (1973) ••••••••••••••••••••••

41

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-572b (West Supp. 1981) •.••••••

41

Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, §3924 (1974) ••••••.•••.••••••.•••

41

D.C. Code Encycl. §16-923 (West Supp. 1978-1979) ••••..••

41

Fla. Stat. Ann. §771.01 (West 1964) •.••••••...•••.••..•.

42

Ga. Code Ann. §30-109.l (1980) ••••••••••..••..•••••..•••

41

Ind. Code Ann. §34-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1980) •••••••••••••

41

v

74

77' 78' 79'
80

STATUTES

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §413.140(l)(c)

(Bobbs-Merrill Supp.

1980) ·•·······•••········•·········•···········•···
43
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §167 (1981) •..•••...••••...

41

Md. Cts.

(1980) •••••..•

41

Mich. Comp. Laws §600.2901 (1968) (Mich. Stat. Ann.
§27A.2901) (1980) •.•••.•.••.•..••.•••••••••..••••.••.

41

Minn. Stat. Ann. §553. 02 (West Supp. 1981) • • • • • • . • • • • . • •

41

Mont. Code Ann. §27-1-601 (1979) •••.•.•••••••.•. ••••••••

~

Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.380 (1979)

41

N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:23-l (West 1952)

42

N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §80-a (McKinney 1976) • • • • •• •• • • • • . •

42

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.29 (Page Supp. 1980) •.•••••• •.

42

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, §8.l (West Supp. 1980-1981) •• •

42

Or. Rev. Stat. §30.840 (1979) ••••.•••.•••••••••••••••••.

41

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, §170 (Purdon 1965)

42

R.I. Gen. Law §9-1-14 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) •••••••.

43

Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012 (Supp. 1977) •••••••••••••••.••

77

Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4 (1976) ••••••••••••••••.••••••••.•

34

Utah Code Ann. §78-25-1 (1977) •.•••••••••••••••••••••.••

33

Utah Code Ann. §78-51-36 (1977) ••..••••••••••••.••••••••

3, 8,,:1
75, l:.1·
78, Ji

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §1001 (Supp. 1980-1981) ••••••••.

42

Va. Code §8.01-220 (1977) •••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••.•

41

W. Va. Code §56-3-2A (Supp. 1980) ••.••.••••.•••••••••.•.

41

Wis. Stat. Ann. §768.01 (West 1980) .••••••••••••.•••....

41

Wyo. Stat. §1-23-101 (1977) .•••.••.•.•.••••.••.•••••••.•

41

&

Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §5-30l(a)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vi

!

RULES
Page
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39 .. . . . . • . . • . . . . . . .

71, 72

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 9

33

.........................

Utah Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit
Courts, Rule 2. 5 •.......•.•....••••••••••••....•••..

3, 8, 74, 75,
76, 87

OTHER AUTHORITIES
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §827 (1979)

80

16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §829 (1979)

80

Annot., Element of Causation in Alienation of Affections
Action, 19 A.L.R.2d471 (1951) ••••••••••••••••..•.••

58

Black's Law Dictionary 862, "Malice" (5th ed. 1979) ••••

69

2

w.

Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 8, at *139 (Cooley
3d ed. 1884) . • . • . . • • . • . • • • • • . • •• • . • . • • ••• • • • • . . • • • • •

30, 31

H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States, §10.2, at 267 (1968) ...••••.•••.•.••...••.••

36, 39, 40, 4

Comment, Alienation of Affections:
Flourishing
Anachroni~m, 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 585 (1977)

·30

Comment, Piracy on the Matrimonial Seas--The Law and the
Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L. J. 594 (1971) •.•••••••

58

M. Grossman, The New York Law of Domestic Relations
§313 (1947) • • • • . • . • • . . • • • • . . . . . • ••••••• •• • • • • • • . • • • •

37

Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its
Existence Be Justified Today1, 56 N.D. L. Rev. 237
(1980) .••••.•••••.•..•..•••...••.•••••••••••.••.•..•

34, 35, 36, 3
38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vii

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,
PlaintiffRespondent,

Case No. 17, 667

vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action at law to recover money damages
for the alleged alienation of his former wife's affections by
defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried without a jury on January 21, 1981,
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah.

Defendant was not represented by counsel

at the time of trial.

The trial court awarded judgment in plain-

tiff's favor against defendant in the total amount of $84,600,
$25,000 of which constituted punitive damages.

(A copy of the

trial court's "Findings and Judgment," dated January 29, 1981, is
set forth in Appendix "A" of this brief.)

Defendant then retained

his present counsel and moved the court for a new trial .and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
the court on March 13, 1981.

Both motions were denied by

(A copy of the trial court's "Order

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Denying Motion For New Trial And For Judgment Notwithstanding The
Verdict" is set forth in Appendix "B.")

Defendant objected to

I

the findings of fact contained in the trial court's March 13, 198,

1

order (see Appendix "C"), but the trial court refused to sustain
defendant's objections and refused to modify its earlier findings

!

I
1

'!

with the exception of an insignificant amendment thereto, set fort·
in Appendix "D.

II

Defendant's "Notice of Appeal" was filed on Apri;
!

9, 1981.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court on either of two
independent grounds:

( l) the common law of the State of Utah no

longer recognizes an action at law for the alienation of a spouse's!
affections; or,

(2) the evidence below and the trial court's

fin~

ings of fact wholly fail to establish the fundamental elements of
a cause of action for alleged alienation of affections.

In the

alternative, defendant seeks reversal of the trial court and remand for a new trial on either of two independent grounds:
defendant was denied due process of law in the pre-trial
employed by the court below; or,

(1)

proc~ua

(2) the trial court's findings of

I
'

I

I

fact and conclusions of law are so inadequate as to virtually
preclude comprehensive appellate review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Procedural Facts. 1

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 27, 1979.

Def en·

dant retained David P. Brown to represent him in this matter, and
1

The clerk below failed to paginate the transcript of the pr:
ceedings as part of, the record on appeal; therefore, reference ,
hereinafter
will be made to the record, "R., • and to the transcrlt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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i

i

Brown filed an answer on defendant's behalf on October 26, 1979.

' I

The case was originally set for trial on March 26, 1980, but the
latter setting was converted into a pre-trial setting pursuant to

11

I

the request of both counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant.
R. 6.

1
'

!

The March 26, 1980 pre-trial was continued pursuant to the

stipulation of both counsel.

R. 8.

Although the record does not

reflect the reasons therefor, two pre-trial settings were subse-

ri:

quently vacated on May 7, 1980 and July 2, 1980.
!

R. 9, 10.

The

record does not disclose that these settings were vacated exclusively at the request or insistence of defendant.
a pre-trial was scheduled for October 15, 1980.

Subsequently,
R. 10.

The record indicates, however, that on July 29, 1980, the

:

sl

1

l·

parties, through counsel, stipulated to dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice.

R. 11.

On September 12, 1980, defendant's attorney was granted leave
to withdraw as counsel in this matter.

R. 12.

The certificates

of mailing on Brown's Withdrawal of Counsel and Petition for Approval
of Withdrawal of Counsel do not indicate that copies thereof were

re

ot

mailed to defendant.
I

I

See R. 12-13.

Plaintiff did not file with

the court or serve on defendant notice to appoint another attorney
or to appear in person as specifically required by Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) §78-51-36 (1977) and by Rule 2.5 of the Rules of
Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.
R.

en·

i

53.
Thereafter, on December 26, 1980, plaintiff petitioned the

trial court "to set aside" its July 29, 1980 order of dismissal,
"to reinstate the action," and to set the matter for non-jury
trial.

The affidavit of plaintiff '.s counsel accompanied the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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aforementioned petition.

In his affidavit, plaintiff's counsel

represented to the trial court that defendant had breached the
terms of the settlement agreement between the parties, upon which
the earlier stipulation and order of dismissal were based.

Plain-

tiff scheduled a hearing on his petition for January 7, 1981 and
mailed notice thereof to defendant on December 26, 1980.

No noticel

to appoint another attorney or appear in person was filed or servec
with plaintiff's petition and notice.

2

On January 7, 1981, plaintiff's petition to set aside
reinstate was apparently granted by Judge Tibbs.

and~

At the time of

the January 7 hearing, defendant was present in the courtroom,
although plaintiff's counsel was temporarily absent.

R. 83; Tr.(,

The following is the complete transcript of the trial court's
"hearing" on plaintiff's petition:
THE COURT: We are now on Civil 7928, Nelson vs.
Jacobsen.
Is Mr. Mciff here?
THE CLERK:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to set this case for hearing
on January 21st at 10:00 A.M., following the law and
motion matters.
You notify Mr. Mciff accordingly.
THE CLERK:

I will.

Tr. 4 (emphasis added).
2

Defendant's former counsel received notice of plaintiff's
petition to set aside the stipulation and order of dismissal. ~
his letter informing Judge Tibbs that he would not be present at
the hearing thereon, Brown wrote:
It seems to me that the counsel for the plaintiff needs to give the defendant an opportunity
to acquire new counsel before any further hearings are had in this matter.
See letter, dated January 6, 1981, from David P. Brown to Judge ,
Don V. Tibbs (emphasis added).
(The original of this letter is
in the record on a~peal, but was not paginated by the clerk be]o·,;
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Defendant left the courtroom immediately after the lower court
set the matter "for hearing."

R. 82.

Approximately 20 minutes

thereafter, counsel for plaintiff appeared in court and inquired
whether the case had been set.

The court informed counsel of the

date and time of the setting and told the clerk to notify defendant
of "this hearing."

Tr. 4 (emphasis added), see also, R. 20 (the

clerk's minute entry of January 7, 1981 clearly states: "this
matter is set for hearing") (emphasis added).

On January 14, 1981,

the lower court executed an order "reinstating" the case.

The

January 14 order also contained a notice of trial setting.

The

order and notice were not filed with the clerk until Friday, January 16, 1981.

R. 25.

It is undisputed that defendant received

the notice of trial setting on Monday, January 19, 1981, R. 84, and
that it was on this date defendant was first notified that a trial
of this matter was scheduled for January 21, 1981.

R. 84.

Defen-

dant was required to prepare his case for trial upon two days
notice.

Defendant appeared pro se at the January 21 trial.

The

record does not disclose that defendant was advised of his right
to a jury trial, nor does it disr.lose that defendant was advised
of any rights he may have had to request a continuance.
Trial of this matter commenced at 2:00 p.m. on January 21,
1981.

Prior to plaintiff's opening statement, the following

interchange between the lower court and defendant occurred:
THE COURT: The matter before the Court is 7928,
Brett w. Nelson, Plaintiff, vs. Jeff Jacobsen, Defendant.
Are you ready to proceed?
MR. McIFF:

The Plaintiff is ready, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Jacobsen?

MR. JACOBSEN:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE
Are Funding
you forrepresented
by any
attorney,
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MR. JACOBSEN:
No, Your Honor.
I'd like to offer a
brief explanation of my apology for that.
I had an
attorney and since my funds were depleted, I sold everything I owned trying to retain this attorney and subsequently I couldn't pay any more for an attorney over the
years this has gone on and so I was unable to acquire
legal counsel because of financial difficulties, so I
spoke to Mr. Brown, the Prosecuting Attorney of Sanpete
County, and he went over everything with me and advised
me that because of my financial situation, I'd better
defend myself, so I'm prepared to do that.
THE COURT: You understand, of course, that it's
the Court's obligation to hear the evidence and make a
ruling based upon the evidence and be fair to both
parties under the law, do you understand that?
MR. JACOBSEN:
Yes, I do, Your Honor.
I hope you'll
bear with me in the fact that I'm not versed in any Court
procedures or anything like that but
THE COURT: You have a right to represent yourself
and likewise I have to rule and make certain rulings that
you might not understand.
MR. JACOBSEN:
I understand.
everyth.ing will probably be -THE COURT:
Mr. Jacobsen?

The terminology and

Alright, are you prepared to go forward,

MR. JACOBSEN:

Yes, I am.

Tr. 6-7.
The trial, of course, resulted in judgment against defendant
in the amount of $84,600.00.
In his affidavits in support of his motion for a new trial,
defendant explained in detail the circumstances surrounding his
termination of his former counsel, Mr. David P. Brown, of Salt
Lake City.

(Copies of said affidavits are set forth in Appendice:

"E" and "F.")

Mr. Brown asked for and received from defendant a

retainer totaling $7, 000. 00.

Brown specifically represented to

defendant that $6,500.00 would be held in a "trust fund . . ·to
negotiate a settlement with Mr. Nelso.n's attorney, pay any addi·
tional attorney's f~es that were incurred, and refund the baLl~
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In

approxi~ately

August of 1980, Brown informed defendant

that settlement with plaintiff had been negotiated in the amount
of $5,000.00 and that defendant should forward said amount to his
office.

R. 52.

Defendant instructed Brown to pay the settlement

amount out of that part of defendant's retainer which Brown held
"in trust."

Brown replied that the entire retainer had been applied

as payment for the legal services he had rendered defendant to that
date.

R. 52.
Upon defendant's protest, Brown stated that if defendant

discharged him, he would refund $1,300.00 to defendant.

R. 52.

Defendant discharged Brown, but specifically requested that Brown
send him copies of all the documents and material contained in
defendant's file.

Brown failed to deliver both the requested

copies and/or the file itself and refused to instruct defendant
concerning the procedure the court would likely follow subsequent
to his withdrawal as defendant's counsel.

R. 52.

As noted above,

Brown withdrew as defendant's counsel, with court approval, on
September 12, 1980.

R. 12.

Copies of neither Brown's Withdrawal

as Counsel nor his Petition for Approval of Withdrawal of Counsel
were mailed to defendant, and plaintiff, as noted above, failed to
file with the court or serve upon defendant notice to appoint
another attorney or to appear in person.

~1
I

The primary thrust of defendant's motion for a new trial was
that he had been denied due process of law because he had not received adequate and timely notice of trial, and as a result, he had
not been afforded a reasonable and fair opportunity to present his
defense in a meaningful way.

R. 31, 35-43.

The lower court denied

defendant's motion and made various findings of fact, ~~~Appendix
"B," to
which defendant vigorously and extensively objected.
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See

Appendix "C."

Of particular importance was the lower court's

failure to find as fact the date upon which defendant received
actual notice of the trial setting and its failure to find that
plaintiff failed to give the statutory notice required by U.C.A.

§78-51-36 (1977) and Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.
B.

Substantive Facts.

From January to October of 1979, the time period in issue in
this litigation, plaintiff was married to Brenda Lee Nelson.
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 27, 1979.

It is un-

disputed that plaintiff and Brenda Nelson were divorced subsequent

i
I

I

to the filing of this action, although the record below does

n~

indicate the exact date upon which the decree became final.

Defen-1

dant requests this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that
the divorce between plaintiff and Brenda became final on Febrwry

1, 1980.

{See footnote 4; a copy of said divorce decree is set

forth in Appendix "G.")
It is also undisputed that at the time of trial, defendant ani/
Brenda Nelson Jacobsen were husband and wife.

I

Defendant testifiea

i

at trial that his relationship with Brenda did not become romantic!
or mature into marriage until "several months" after
Brenda were divorced.

Tr. 79.

plaintiff~/

No evidence was introduced

I

bel~

with respect to the specific date upon which defendant and Bnn~ '
I

were married.

Defendant requests this Court to take judicial

I

notice of the fact that defendant and Brenda Nelson Jacobsen ftR I
married on October 1, 1980.

(See footnote 4; a copy of the roarri· 1

age certificate of defendant and Brenda Nelson Jacobsen is set
forth in Appendix "H.")
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I

Plaintiff testified at trial that he first became acquainted
with defendant in approximately January of 1979.

Tr. 18.

It is

undisputed that plaintiff, Brenda and defendant became friends at
the time of their initial acquaintance and that plaintiff and
Brenda occasionally invited defendant into their home.
94, 104.

Tr. 19, 32,

Moreover, defendant testified that plaintiff and Brenda

occasionally visited him at his home in Axtell, Utah.

Tr. 70.

Plaintiff did not testify to the contrary.
From January to June of 1979, plaintiff, Brenda and defendant
had extensive contacts.

(See below.)

Plaintiff testified that in

June of 1979 he became aware that defendant was "seeing" his wife.
Tr. 19.

The bulk of plaintiff's evidence at trial concerned the

conduct and contacts between the parties and Brenda from June to
October of 1979.
In the context of alienation of affections litigation, the
conduct of at least three persons is always relevant:
(2) defendant; and,
is no exception.

(3) the allegedly alienated spouse.

(1) plaintiff;
This case

Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial with

respect to his own conduct, and the conduct of both defendant and
Brenda.

For purposes of convenience and analysis, therefore, the

conduct of each of the three principals must be analyzed as it
bears upon the ultimate issue in this case, i.e., whether defendant
"wilfully and intentionally" alienated Brenda's affections for
plaintiff. See, Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759,
763 (1954).
1.

Plaintiff Brett Nelson

Plaintiff's only testimony at trial regarding the nature of
his "affection" for Brenda was as follows:
Q: Were you divorced in this Court s~metime
during the latter part of that year, in 1979?
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A:

Yes.

Q:
After the divorce, did you have contact
with her?
A:

Yes,

I did.

Q:

Did you still feel affection for her?

A:

Yes,

Q:

Did you express that affection to her?

A:

Yes.

Q:

On one occasion or many occasions?

A:

Many occasions.

I did.

* * *
Q:
Throughout the whole course of the problems
once you discovered it existed to the end of
that year, was there any time when you did not
feel affection for your wife, and wanted her,
and wanted to make that marriage work?
A:

Pardon?

Q: Beginning with June, when you first became
aware of the problem to the end of the year of
1979, did you feel affection for her that
whole time and wanted, if possible, to make
that marriage work?
A:
Tr.

29-30.

Yes,

I did.

Plaintiff offered no further specifics regarding the

nature or quality of his affections for Brenda prior to their
divorce.
Significant evidence was presented at trial regarding statements and conduct by plaintiff which clearly indicated his lacko'.
affection for Brenda.

For example, on those occasions when plaint::l

became upset with Brenda, he frequently called plaintiff's father
"to come and get her."

Tr.

44.

On one occasion, after having

become upset with Brenda, plaintiff "pushed
her to "get out" of their home and leave.

(her] around" and toi"
Tr.

96.

A friend of

plaintiff and Brend~, Linda Springer, testified that she was a~~
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I

1

they became acguainted with defendant.

Tr. 91.

In fact, Brenda

testified that in August or September of 1978, a few months after
they were married and long before they became acquainted with
defendant, plaintiff told Brenda that he wanted a divorce from
her.

Tr. 105.

Finally, Brenda testified that on the evening

plaintiff was fired from his job as a truck driver, plaintiff came
home "screaming" and threatened to beat her.

Tr. 108.

As to what

next transpired, Brenda testified as follows:
I came out [of the bedroom] and asked him what
was wrong, and he was sitting there, throwing
the knife in the floor and I said, "What are
you doing with the knife," and he just says,
"Well, I just hate you, you so and so, and you
better call your dad and have him come and get
you," and then I went to call and he grabbed
the phone and he said, "never mind.
I'll call
him," so he called him.
Tr. 108 (emphasis added).
Regarding the nature of plaintiff's affections for Brenda,
Linda Springer testified as follows:
Q: And isn't it true that he had a great amount
of affection towards his wife and it was extremely
difficult for him to adjust to the fact that he
was losing her?
A:
I don't think that's a fair statement or
question to be asking.
Q:

Let me break it down:

It is true, is it not, that he was extremely
distraught and uptight concerning that he was
losing his wife?

~
I

A:
In ways, yes; other ways, no, he wasn't. He
would act like he was concerned but every time
that they were together, which I was with them
many a time, he would always bring the subject
up and there might have been a problem, bu~ he
wouldn't let it die. He had to keep needling at
it.

Tr. 90 (emphasis added).
In short, defendant presented substantial evidence that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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deteriorated prior to and during the time period at issue in this
litigation.

Plaintiff failed to introduce any rebuttal testimony

1

to refute the evidence presented by defendant in this regard.
The trial court failed to expressly find as fact whether or
not plaintiff and Brenda enjoyed any reciprocal marital affections
prior to or during the time period at issue in this case.

The

trial court's only finding of fact which contains the word

"af~~

tion" is finding of fact #2, which recites that defendant "did
alienate the affection of Brenda Nelson for her husband, Brett
Nelson."

R.

27.

The trial court failed to make any other

expr~s

or specific findings of supporting or subsidiary facts with respect
to

th~

presence or absence of reciprocal affections in the marriage I

of plaintiff and Brenda.
Substantial evidence was introduced at trial that plaintiff
had a serious alcohol problem during the course of his marriage
Brenda and frequently battered and abused her.

~ i

Substantial evidenc!

was also introduced that plaintiff's history of alcohol abuse

a~

battery of his wife were the primary causes of the alienation of
any affection Brenda may have had for him.

1

I

Linda Springer testifieil

that, although plaintiff may have perceived defendant as the "probld
in the marriage," nevertheless, "drinking and violence was the
main thing that made Brenda keep leaving him •

Tr. 93.

Linda Springer also testified that plaintiff's "drinking problem'
was common knowledge and was the primary cause of physical confrontations between plaintiff and Brenda, which occasionally resulted in physical injuries to either or both of them.

Tr. 91°

Springer testified further that on the night plaintiff was
terminated from his trucking job, she was at the Nelson home when
he came home at approximately 3: 00 or 4: 00 a.m.

Tr. 85.
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Tr.

86.

Plaintif

With respect to this incident, plaintiff testified that he
caught defendant and Brenda "standing over there talking," and as
a result, grabbed her by the arm and took her around to the front
of his pickup to ask her "what was going on."

Tr. 34.

After

Brenda's explanation that she and defendant "were only talking,"
plaintiff told Brenda that they were going home.

Plaintiff testi-

fied that defendant then struck him, knocked him down, and eventually
kicked him in the face.

No rebuttal testimony was introduced re-

garding Brenda's testimony that plaintiff physically assaulted her
and abused her that evening.
Finally, Brenda testified with respect to a serious altercation between herself and plaintiff, after which she left her home
and went to defendant's home.

(Although defendant was uncertain

with respect to the date of this incident, he testified that it
took place in approximately September of 1979.

Tr. 78.t

Although

Brenda did not specifically testify as to causes of the altercation,
she did testify that plaintiff was drunk, and she, defendant and
her father all testified concerning the physical injuries she
sustained as a result of this altercation with plaintiff.

Tr. 99.

Brenda testified:
had bruises on my arms from him grabbing me,
had bruises on my back from him pushing me
against the wall.
I had knots on my head from
being slammed against the wall.
I had rug
burns on my legs while he was kicking, while
I was on the floor and my fingers were swollen
from him hitting me with his cast.
I
I

Tr. 100.
Defendant testified as follows regarding Brenda's injuries
on this occasion:
She was bleeding from the corner of the mouth,
her face was bruised, she ~as bruised all up
the arms·, the back of her head was just a
series
of Law
knots,
she
had provided
red bypuffy
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Plaintiff's history of alcohol abuse was inextricably interwoven with his consistent battery and physical abuse of Brenda.
In addition to the knife incident referred to above, Brenda testified at trial regarding three specific occasions upon each of
she was physically abused by plaintiff.

whi~

First, Brenda testified

that plaintiff got drunk and physically abused her on an Easter
outing in 1979.

R. 94.

Apparently, plaintiff, Brenda, defendant

and a few of their friends "went out on the desert" for a social
and recreational outing during the Easter holiday.

After defendant

returned home, and after plaintiff had imbibed significant amounts
of alcohol, plaintiff and Brenda commenced arguing.

As the argu-

ment ensued, plaintiff eventually pushed Brenda to the ground

a~

"bit" her on the back, leaving red marks where plaintiff's teeth
had broken her skin.

R. 94-95.

Plaintiff testified that he and

Brenda "got along great" during the Easter outing and did not
fight "at all."

Tr.

34.

Second, Brenda testified concerning plaintiff's abuse of her
during a social gathering at Black Mountain in June of 1979.
95-96.

tr.

Brenda testified that, during the course of the outing, she

walked by defendant and said "hello," at which time plaintiff saw
her.

Plaintiff immediately grabbed Brenda, pulled her around in

front of a truck, and threw her down to the ground.

Tr. 96.

Plaintiff then told Brenda that they "were going home."

Tr. 96.

Brenda replied that she was not going home with plaintiff if he wa;
"going to act like this."

Tr. 96.

Thereafter, plaintiff

be~n

pushing Brenda around again and eventually threw her down a secon~
time.

Tr. 96.

Plaintiff then approached defendant and atte~t~ '

to throw a punch at him.

Defendant eventually struck plaintiff.

·That evening, upon 'returning home, plaintiff "physically assault;
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With respect to this incident, plaintiff testified that he
caught defendant and Brenda "standing over there talking," and as

i-

a result, grabbed her by the arm and took her around to the front

1ich

of his pickup to ask her "what was going on."

Tr. 34.

After

Brenda's explanation that she and defendant "were only talking,"
plaintiff told Brenda that they were going home.

Plaintiff testi-

fied that defendant then struck him, knocked him down, and eventually

1t

kicked him in the face.

No rebuttal testimony was introduced re-

laM

garding Brenda's testimony that plaintiff physically assaulted her

rts

and abused her that evening.

u-

Finally, Brenda testified with respect to a serious altercation between herself and plaintiff, after which she left her home

nd

and went to defendant's home.

(Although defendant was uncertain

with respect to the date of this incident, he testified that it
took place in approximately September of 1979.

Tr. 78.)

Although

Brenda did not specifically testify as to causes of the altercation,
er

she did testify that plaintiff was drunk, and she, defendant and

~.

her father all testified concerning the physical injuries she

~
~w

sustained as a result of this altercation with plaintiff.

Tr. 99.

Brenda testified:
had bruises on my arms from him grabbing me,
had bruises on my back from him pushing me
against the wall.
I had knots on my head from
being slammed against the wall.
I had rug
burns on my legs while he was kicking, while
I was on the floor and my fingers were swollen
from him hitting me with his cast.
I
I

1n

6.
e~

Tr. 100.
con~

ted
f.

·r ..

Defendant testified as follows regarding Brenda's injuries
on this occasion:
She was bleeding from the corner of the mouth,
her face was bruised, she was bruised all up
the arms, 'the back of her head was just a
ofLawknots,
hadprovided
redby puffy
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swollen.
She had very little muscle tone on
her fingers, and they were puffed like this
on both hands from Brett beating her with
a cast. • . . She could not straighten up.
She was doubled over.
Tr. 79.
After plaintiff beat her, Brenda left her home and eventually
went to defendant's home.

Brenda's father came to defendant's

~u

to retrieve his daughter approximately "six hours at the most"
after she had arrived there.

Tr. 100.

Brenda's father

descri~d

as follows her injuries he observed at the time he arrived at
defendant's home:
I can describe what I saw.
She was black and
blue from the top of her head to her toes.
She had big knots on her hands and on her
wrists and on her head and she had bruises on
her wrists.
She couldn't hardly--she couldn't
bend over.
She'd been worked over and her
hands were all puffed up • • • •

Tr. 119-120.
Plaintiff testified that this specific altercation occurnd
in the latter part of August, 1979.

Tr. 27.

With respect to the

circumstances surrounding the incident, plaintiff testified that
he began interrogating Brenda on the evening in question concernin:
her "sexually [sic] involvement" with defendant.

Tr. 27.

Plaintiff

testified that he "asked her about that and I finally got her
to 10 or 12 times."

Tr. 27.

Later that evening, plaintiff test1·

fied that Brenda asked him to take her to defendant's house.
27.

~~

fi,

Plaintiff testified that approximately one-half hour af~r~

refused to take her, "she got upset and tore into me, and started
clawing me and biting me

Tr. 28.

Plaintiff did concede,

however, that he slapped Brenda with the palm of his hand and P~~
her away in order to defend himself and "to settle her down." ft
46.

Plaintiff spec'ifically testified that this August altercatio
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was the "first and the last" time he engaged in any "physical

I

viol<'nce" vis-a-vis Brenda.

Tr.

47.

So pervasive was plaintiff's alcohol problem and physical
abuse of Brenda in their marriage that Brenda repeatedly testified
at trial that plaintiff's conduct, not defendant's, was the cause
of her repeatedly leaving plaintiff.

Specifically, Brenda testified

that the reason she repeatedly left plaintiff was because he got
"drunk and he pushed me around

Tr. 104.

Each time Brenda

returned to plaintiff after temporarily leaving him, she explained
to him that his drinking, partying and physical abuse of her had
to stop.

Tr. 101.

Because the drinking and the physical abuse did

not stop, Brenda left plaintiff.

Tr. 101.

Brenda testified:

Well, every time I left, like in that last few
months, when I kept going back to Brett, every
time I would leave, it would be because of something, some physical violence that he had done.
That's the reason.
Tr. 107 (emphasis added).

On cross-examination by plaintiff's

counsel, Brenda also testified:

Q:
Did Brett consistently tell you over the
period of time that he wanted you, that he wanted
to make the marriage work, that he wanted you to
leave Jacobsen alone, and that he loved you and
that he wanted to keep your marriage together?
A:
Yes, he
I wanted to
cause Brett
get violent

told me that he wanted to try and
try too but it just didn't work out
would keep getting drunk and he'd
and it just did not work.

Tr. 111 (emphasis added).
Brenda testified that it was plaintiff's alcoholism and his
physical abuse of her, not defendant or his conduct, which eventually caused her to leave plaintiff.

Tr. 101.

In addition to evidence of alcoholism and physical abuse of
Brenda, some evidence was introduced at trial regarding plaintiff's
own marital

infide~ity.

On the night he was terminated from his

trucking
job, plaintiff had a 16-year-old girl in the cab of his
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truck during a substantial portion of his shift.

Tr. 38.

Plain-

tiff admitted that his conduct on that evening was improper.
38.

~.

Linda Springer, the girl who spent part of plaintiff's late

night shift in the cab of his truck, testified that plaintiff we.s
drunk on that occasion and "made passes" at her.

Tr. 83.

Moreover, plaintiff admitted that on at least one occasion he
and Brenda had a confrontation because of his contact with another
girl.

Tr.

42.

Additionally, al though Brenda conceded that she was

not aware of any specific acts of misconduct, she testified that
upon returning from the Black Mountain outing referred to above,
she discovered plaintiff at home with "another girl there,"

a~

thereafter, plaintiff took the girl to her home in his truck.

96.

Finally, defendant testified that on several occasions

Tr.

wh9~

fortuitously met plaintiff, Brenda and their friends "around town,"
plaintiff was with Linda Springer.

Tr. 74.

Partially in anticipation of these allegations of impropriety
and infidelity, plaintiff testified on redirect as follows:

Q: He also asked you about the contacts and
conversations with other girls.
I [ask] you,
prior to this problem arising in your marriage
with this Defendant, have you ever had any
involvement with any other woman?
A:

No,

I didn't.

Tr. 48 (emphasis added).
In anticipation of the substantial testimony regarding his
alcoholism, plaintiff testified that he did not use alcohol "er
cessively."

Tr. 36.

Although conceding plaintiff had been arrestd

for drunk driving prior to his marriage to Brenda and although
conceding plaintiff's drinking had increased four times since the
discovery of the alleged relationship between defendant and BrendJ,
plaintiff's parents' testified that plaintiff did not have an aJcol
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I

In addition to his

regarding the specific acts of

testi~ony

physical abuse referred to above, plaintiff generally denied that
he had battered or abused Brenda.

Plaintiff's testimony, however,

was substantially inconsistent in one important particular.

Plain-

tiff testified that the evening in August of 1979 on which he and
Brenda were involved in an altercation, was the only occasion on
which he "had any physical fights that she left and went to [defendant's] place."

Tr. 29.

He reiterated that position on cross-

examination by stating that this incident was "the first and the
last" time he "had any physical violence" vis-a-vis Brenda.

Tr.

47.

Plaintiff also testified that he sustained scratches, bites,
and bruises from Brenda's kicks and that Brenda sustained no physical injury whatsoever.

Tr. 29.

In rebuttal, however, after exten-

sive evidence presented by defendant with respect to the continuous
course of plaintiff's conduct in abusing and battering his wife,
plaintiff testified as to an additional fight, on or about October
27, 1979, between Brenda and himself.

Plaintiff introduced Exhibit

1, a picture purporting to depict the condition of plaintiff's
chest following the October fight, to substantiate his testimony
that he was scratched by Brenda during the October altercation.
(See Exhibit 1.)

Plaintiff concluded:

Q:
Can you recall any instance when she left,
other than the final time of October 27th, which
was preceded by violence, violent contact
between you and her?
A:

Absolutely not, no.

Tr. 122.
In short, after emphatically stating that the August fight
constituted the only physical violence between himself and Brenda,
plaintiff
countermanded that testimony by stating that the October
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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27 fight constituted the only occasion of physical violence
them.

betw~

Plaintiff then directly contradicted his earlier testimony

regarding the fight in the latter part of August or first part of
September by emphatically stating that on that occasion no

physi~

violence preceded Brenda's leaving their home to go to defendant's
home.

Tr. 121-122.
Plaintiff also attempted to ptove at trial that the discoRry

of the alleged relationship between defendant and Brenda had an
impact on his employment.

Specifically, plaintiff testified

th~

he changed employment in July of 1979 so that he could "be around
the home a little more" and "be a little closer to [his] wife .... ·
Tr. 25.

Plaintiff also testified that since July of 1979 he had

not been able to secure steady employment which compensated him at
the same salary he had been earning at this first job.

Tr. 31.

Upon cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily
quit his first job, and he admitted that he had been offered a
second job prior to his voluntary termination.

Tr.

3 7.

Irrespect:re

of what plaintiff's subjective motives were for voluntarily quitiny
his first job, it is undisputed that plaintiff never communicated
those motives to his former wife, Brenda Nelson.

Brenda testifieo

under cross-examination:

Q: Okeh, up until Brett learned of your involvement with Mr. Jacobsen, he didn't have any problem
at work and he was gainfully employed and regularly
employed.
A:

There was no problem with me and Mr. JacobBrett just quit his job.
I don't have any
He never told me he was quitting to be
with me.
He told me he wasquittingbecause he
didn't like the coal mines.
~en.
i~ea.

Tr. 102-103 (emphasis added).
With respect to his second job as a truck driver, plaintiff
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professed a lack of memory with respect to the reason for his

termination therefrom.
th~

Tr.

37.

Plaintiff did admit, however, that

night of his termination he had been drinking and he had im-

prooerly allowed a 16-year-old girl to be in the cab of his truck
during a significant portion of his shift.

Tr. 38.

(As noted

above, this was the evening plaintiff admitted returning home and
threatening Brenda with a knife.

See, Tr. 45.)

Brenda testified, however, that plaintiff was fired from his
trucking job because he was drunk on the evening of his termination
and because he allowed a young girl to be in the cab of his truck
during his shift.

Tr. 97.

Finally, plaintiff's mother testified

that after he had been fired, plaintiff eventually returned "back
to the coal mine: the job he originally quit to be "around home a
little more."

Tr. 62.

The trial court's findings of fact are ambiguously

and~

pletely silent with respect to plaintiff's alcoholism, battery and
physical abuse of his wife, and marital infidelity.

The trial

court also failed to make any findings with respect to the effects
of the same on plaintiff and Brenda's marriage.

Moreover, the

trial court made no findings whatsoever with respect to plaintiff's
employment and the extent to which the alleged conduct of defendant
had any effect thereon.
Finally, little evidence, if any, was introduced in support
of the trial court's findings regarding damages.

The only evidence

with respect to the damages plaintiff allegedly suffered as a
result of defendant's conduct was as follows:

(1) plaintiff testi-

fied that "this thing" had "had an impact" on him, Tr. 31; (2)
plaintiff's father testified that from June to August of 1979,
plaintiff's "outlook on life" had changed considerably and
plaintiff was "terribly hurt and . . . he just acted like he wanted
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to be alone," Tr. 54; (3) plaintiff's father also testified that

plaintiff "would just shun us," and "spent a lot of time in the
mountains," Tr.

54;

(4) plaintiff's mother acknowledged that ther,

had been "a significant difference" with respect to plaintiff's
•overall behavior pattern," Tr. 62; however,
admitted that he was "on the upswing."

(5) plaintiff's mothct

Tr. 62.

Plaintiff intro-

duced no other evidence of damage.
2.

Brenda Nelson Jacobsen

Plaintiff testified at trial that he and Brenda first
acquainted with defendant sometime in January of 1979.

beca~

Tr. 18-19,

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff,
Brenda and defendant had any contact whatsoever prior to January
1979.

Thus, the first contact between the three apparently

occurred at a New Year's Eve party on December 31, 1978 and
ary 1, 1979.

Jan~

Tr. 67.

Defendant testified that on that occasion, in the context of
"a typical New Year's Eve" party, at which "everybody was pretey
looped," Brenda approached him and told him she wanted to
bed with him.

Tr. 67.

go~

This was apparently the first encounter

between defendant and Brenda, and, according to defendant's
futed testimony, Brenda initiated the contact.

un~

The second contact

between defendant and Brenda was also initiated by Brenda.

Defen·

dant testified at trial, and his testimony was not refuted in

a~

particular, that approximately one week after the New Year's Eft
party referred to above, Brenda came to his home at approximateij
1:00 a.m.

Tr. 68.

Defendant's testimony was also unrefuted that

at the time Brenda appeared at his home, defendant observed that
she had been "physically abused."

Tr. 68.

Brenda apparently

stayed on that occasion at defendant's home for a time period of
approximately 1-1/i hours.

Tr. 69.
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1

Fro 1n January to June of 1979, it is undisputed that Brend~
'.lent tQ_del_cndant 's home on approximately 20 different occasions.
Tr.

7 3.

Plaintiff testified that "she

[Jefendant]" on those occasions.

Tr.

[Brenda] was seeing him
2u (emphasis added).

Plain-

tiff also testified that Brenda told him "she had been seeing Jeff."
Tr.

21

(emphasis added).

Defendant testified that on some of these visits, Brenda was
accompanied by plaintiff.

Tr.

70.

Defendant also testified that

on many of these occasions Brenda was accompanied by friends.
Tr.

70.

Brenda's testimony substantiated defendant's that she

was "usually" accompanied by friends on the occasions she visited
defendant at his home, Tr. 98, even on those occasions when Brenda
visited defendant late at night.

Tr. 106.

Substantial evidence was introduced at trial regarding a
number of different incidents from June to October of 1979, upon
which Brenda left plaintiff's home and went to defendant's because
she had been physically abused by plaintiff, Tr.
had fought with plaintiff, Tr.

28, 77, 99; she

27-28; she had been "badgered" by

plaintiff's parents, Tr. 109; she and her girlfriends had nothing
better to do, Tr. 70; and, simply because she and defendant were
"good friends."

Tr. 87.

Brenda specifically testified that on

these occasions, and during the entire time period at issue in this
litigation, there was no misconduct of a suggestive or sexual
nature between defendant

and herself.

Tr. 98-100.

Indeed,

witness testified at trial with respect to ever having seen
physical contact between Brenda and defendant.

~

~n_y

See, e.g., Tr.

56-57.
In addition to the evidence referred to above, two particular
incidents are illuminating.

First, it was Brenda who initiated
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the conversation with defendant at the Black Mountain outing, which
eventually resulted in plaintiff's abuse of her and his altercation
with defendant. Tr. 96.

Second, in approximately August of 1979,

Brenda decided that she needed to go somewhere to think about her
problems and "to try to get [her] head together."

Tr. 24, 104.

In

order to accomplish these objectives, Brenda asked plaintiff if she
could go to Las Vegas with defendant.

Plaintiff consented.

Tr.

24-25, 26, 39, 77, 104.

The overwhelming evidence presented at trial clearly

indica~s

that from the first two contacts between defendant and Brenda in
January of 1979 to October of 1979, Brenda, not defendant,

initia~d

most, if not all, of the contacts.
3.

Defendant Jeff Jacobsen

In his testimony at trial, defendant admitted that Brenda
initiated a number of contacts with him during the time period at
issue in this case, but specifically and emphatically denied any
sexual misconduct.
mony in this regard.

Tr. 6 7.

Brenda corroborated defendant's testi-

Tr. 98-100.

Moreover, no witness testified

at trial concerning any physical contact which he or she had seen
between Brenda and defendant.
Defendant testified, with respect to the occasions upon whicl
Brenda came to his home, as follows:
Q:
On those occasions as well as all those 20
occasions early in the year when she came to
your house, did it ever occur to you to say,
"Brenda, it's not good for you to be here.
You better go back to your own house"?

A:
No, because I knew it was just a friendship
and I was friends with Brett and friends with
Brenda.
The only time I felt I might should
say something is when she came to my home and
she was bleeding and I requested she go to her
father, to which she replied she was afraid
there wou~d be a physical confrontation after
her father seen her and what Brett had done to
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As noted above, on ~any of these occasions, Brenda was accompanied by plaintiff and/or other of her friends.

Moreover, defen-

dant testified, and his testimony was completely unrefuted,

that

he informed plaintiff of those occasions on which Brenda visited
defendant unaccompanied by anyone else.

Tr. 74.

It is also undisputed that both plaintiff and Brenda recognized
that they had problems in their marriage, and both approached
defendant independently for counsel and advice regarding the same.
Defendant testified that plaintiff approached him and informed him
that he and Brenda had a problem in their marriage.
Plaintiff requested that defendant help them.

Tr. 74.

Tr. 74.

Plaintiff

did not identify defendant as one of the problems in his marriage
for which he sought defendant's help.

Plaintiff's mother conceded

that defendant recommended that plaintiff and Brenda seek professional
counseling for their marital problems.

Tr. 63.

Brenda also testified that she contacted defendant regarding
her marital problems with plaintiff:
Q:
In the middle of June when we were talking
out there, you told me that you thought life
with Brett was getting very unbearable and that
he had a problem and he was not correcting
himself at all and you felt like you wanted to
leave him.
Now, what was my response to you?
A:
You told me to do the best I could and try
with Brett; that we were young, and that we had
to try and you just told me to go home and try
it with Brett.
Q:
I did tell you to go home and try to be a
good wife?
A:

Yes, you did.

Q:
Have I ever done anything to you prior to
your divorce from Brett other than [be] a good
friend?

A:

No.
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Q:
Did you consider me a friend of the family,
someone you could come and talk to about your
problems, day and night?

A:

Yes, I did.

Tr. 98.
Linda Springer testified that defendant and she tried to help
plaintiff and Brenda with their problems.

Tr.

87.

Brenda conceded that defendant had not made, during the time
period relevant here, any disparaging comments with respect to her
Tr. 99.

marriage to plaintiff.

Most importantly, Brenda testified

as follows with respect to the effect of defendant's conduct on

h~

marriage with plaintiff:
Q:
You, on the times that you tried to go back
with Brett and patch up your marriage, did you
explain to Brett that his drinking, partying,
and physical abuse had to stop?

A:

Yes, I did several times.

Q:
Did they stop when you went back and tried
to make the marriage work?

A: No, they didn't, and that's why I left him
again.
Q:
You didn't leave him and I didn't personally
put any stress on your marriage to Brett; did I?
A:

No, you didn't.

Tr. 101.
Plaintiff's father testified at trial that on two occasions
he approached defendant regarding plaintiff and Brenda's marria¥·
On the first occasion, he testified that he informed defendant tha:
Brett and Brenda were "having trouble."

Tr. 53.

Defendant was

not identified as the source of the trouble, but plaintiff's fath~'
did request defendant to "leave them alone and let them see if t~
can patch it up."

Tr.

53.

On the second occasion, in approxi~W

September of 1979, plaintiff's father testified that he again
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difficulties.

On that occasion, defendant responded:

do when they're hanging on your door step?'"

"'What can I

Tr. 54.

The trial court's only finding of fact with respect to this
evidence of defendant's conduct was "that the Defendant did wrongfully interfer [sic] with the said marriage and did willfully,
intentionally and maliciously alienate the affection of Brenda
Nelson for her husband, Brett Nelson."

Tr. 27, finding of fact

#2.

In anticipation of defendant's evidence, plaintiff presented
evidence of two conversations with his wife which bear on the issue
of misconduct between Brenda and defendant.

First, plaintiff

testified that some time in June, July or August he had a discussion with her regarding her "involvement with Mr. Jacobsen."
In response to counsel's questions regarding the substance

Tr. 26.

of that discussion, plaintiff testified:
At that time I asked her exactly what was going
on, I wanted to know the truth, and she told me,
"Don't ask me anything you don't want to hear."
And I says, "I want to hear it all," and asked
her how much she had been seeing him, I asked
her if there was any sexual involvement, and
she didn't say yes.
I asked her how many times,
once, twice, three, four or five times. She
didn't answer.
I said, "Eight, nine, or ten or
twelve times." She said, "Yes, probably around
there."
Tr. 26.
Second, plaintiff testified with respect to a conversation he
had with Brenda while they were "outside riding around in the
mountains one night."

Tr. 27.

Plaintiff testified that on that

occasion:
She told me not to ask her anything that I didn't
want to hear and I asked her how many times she'd
been with him, how much involvement and activity
she actually had with him, sexually involvement.
I asked her about that and I finally got her
down to ten or twelve times.
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The trial court specifically found "that the Defendant had
sexual relations with plaintiff's wife on at least six occasions
while plaintiff's marriage was still in force."

R. 27, finding

0,

fact #4.
Plaintiff presented no other evidence of defendant's

alleg~

misconduct.
As noted above, plaintiff and Brenda were divorced on Februar:
1, 1980.

I

Defendant and Brenda were married on October 1, 1980.

Following the presentation of the evidence referred to

a~ft

and the argument of plaintiff's counsel and of defendant, the triai
court orally ruled from the bench as follows:
The Court finds that the Defendant, Jeff Jacobsen, has wrongfully interfered with the marriage
of Brett W. Nelson and his wife, Brenda Lee
Nelson; that he alienated her affections from
her husband's; that he had sexual involvement
with her on more than six separate occasions;
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has suffered
substantial damages and the Court further finds
that the Defendant is now the Plaintiff's exwife's husband.
The Court finds that marriage
and family--that marriage is a sacred institution
and that anyone who interferes with that should
suffer the full consequences of the law and
I'm telling you, Mr. Jacobsen, at this time that
this Court nearly every week is having criminal
trials where people steal money from other people
and in my opinion you've stolen something far more
than money, you have interfered with the whole
basic fabric of society and, when you tell me
its a plutonic relationship, I just say its
nonsense.
I don't buy it at all and I don't want
you to think I do.
I don't know how they're
going to collect any money judgments that I give
against you but they're certainly going to get
one against you and I hope this gets welipubiicized because I'd like everyone to know that if
a cas~ike this comes into my Court, that they
can expect to suffer.
Tr. 123-124 (emphasis added).
Without making any further findings with respect to the

d~

of damages plaintiff allegedly suffered, the court awarded judgrc
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1

loss of consortium.

Tr.

28.

The tric:ll court also awarded punitive

damages against defendant in the amount of $25,000, although no
evidence was introduced at trial with respect to defendant's financial worth as a basis for awarding punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PURSUANT TO ITS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET
AND DECLARE THE COMMON LAW OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AND BASED UPON THE OVERWHELMING POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED BELOW, THIS COURT
SHOULD ABOLISH AN ACTION AT LAW FOR ALIENATION
OF AFFECTIOtlS.
We have become convinced that there is inherent
and fatal contradiction in the term "alienation
of affections." The alienation belies the
affection.
Suits for alienation are useless
as a means of preserving a family. They demean the parties and the courts. We abolish such
a right of recovery and, hence, reverse and
set aside the trial court's judgment.
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981).
The Iowa Supreme Court abolished an action for alienation of
affections because the fundamental assumptions upon which the
action is based are no longer valid or persuasive today, and because overwhelming public policy considerations against preservation
of the action substantially outweigh the all too insignificant
benefits to be gained by preservation thereof.

Like Iowa, more

than half of the jurisdictions in this country have abolished
actions for alienation of affections.

Although the Utah Supreme

Court recognized an action for alienation of affections in Wilson
vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), the overwhelming
historical and public policy considerations hereinafter analyzed
require this Court, stare decisis notwithstanding, to declare that
the common law of the State of Utah no longer recognizes an action
at law for alienation of affections.
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A,

The Social And Domestic Assumptions Upon Which An Actiml

For Alienation Of Affections Was Historically Predicated Are No
Longer Valid Or Persuasive Today.

The early English case of Winsmore vs. Greenbank, 125 Eng. hi
1330 (1745), recognized a husband's right to an action

against~

who intentionally "persuaded, procured and enticed" his wife to
leave the home, resulting in his loss of the wife's "comfort,
society and assistance."

Blackstone acknowledged the

existence~

such an action at law, noting that the action presupposed for~wj
constraint, and concluded that a husband's remedy was by a writoi
ravishment or an action of trespass vi et armis,
abducta.
ed. 1884).

de~ rapta~

2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 8, at *139 (Cooley k'
Blackstone explained the husband's rights and the

substance of this kind of action as follows:
[T]he husband is •
entitled to recover
damages in an action on the case against
such as persuade and entice the wife to
live separate from him without a sufficient
cause.
. • [I]f one's wife missed her way
upon the road, it was not lawful for
another man to take her into his house unless she was benighted and in danger of
being lost or drowned: but a stranger might
carry her behind him on horseback to market
to a justice of the peace for a warrant
against her husband, or to the spiritual
court to sue for a divorce.
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 8, at *139 (Cooley 3rd ed.
1884).
It is generally recognized that the modern action for aliena·

I

tion of affections is but a subsequent historical development~ I
this early action at law.

See, Comment, Alienation of Affect~

Flourishing Anachronism, 13 Wake Forest L.Rev.
Virtually

I

585, 586 (19771· '

all American jurisdictions incorporated an action f~

alienation
of affections into their early common law schemes.
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I

It is universally recognized that the social and domestic
3ssu~ption

upon which an action for alienation of affections was

originally predicated, was that a wife constituted the exclusive
chattel of her husband.

In fact,

a wife was her husband's most

prized "possession":
Early courts were exclusively controlled by
men, and the origin of alienation of affections must necessarily be considered with
that in mind.
At common law, a wife was
more than "mere chattel;" she was a man's
most prized possession.
Therefore, enticing
away a man's wife was perhaps the ultimate
tort.
Such an attitude was exemplified in
Johnson vs. Allen, [100 Il.C. 131, 139, 5
S.E. 666, 669 (1888)] when the court asked,
"What greater tortious injury--deeply
humiliating and afflicting in its nature-could be done to a man [than the act of
enticing away a man's wife and harboring
and debauching her?]."
Comment, Alienation of Affections:
\·lake

Forest L.Rev.

585, 588 (1977)

Flourishing Anachronism, 13
(footnote omitted).

In short, an action for alienation of affections is historically rooted in the common law notion that a wife constituted the
exclusive property of her husband.

For the interference with,

damage to, or theft of his personal

pro~erty,

a husband enjoyed a

cause of action, and in those circumstances where the property at
issue was his wife, such an action was denominated one for "alienation of affections.•

3

3 Although the primary historical assumption upon which alienation actions were founded, was that a wife constituted the chattel
of her husband, this Court, in the context of an action for criminal
conversation, suggested that an additional basis for this kind of
litigation is the assumption that each spouse in a marriage has an
"exclusive right . . . to intercourse with the other." Cahoon vs.
Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959).
I t is difficult today,
however, to recognize that anyone has an exclusive_pr~perty right
to sexual intercourse with his or her spouse. So intimate and so
sacred is sexual intercourse in marriage that modern public policy
should dictate that·no one, not even a spouse, has the absolute right
to demand
sexual intercourse of someone else, including his or her
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It is self-evident, however,

that the domestic,

social, and

public policies of the Eighteenth Century are not necessarily th,
appropriate policies of today, and the longevity of this action

1.

a minority of other jurisdictions is not, ipso facto, a justifica·
tion for preserving a tort predicated upon anachronisms.
A number of jurisdictions have abolished an alienation of
affections action precisely because the assumption that a wife is
the property of her husband is anachronistic.

Fundermann vs.

I

Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981) (the theory upon which
an alienation action is based is "flawed," because such theory is
"rooted in ideas we have long since renounced, involving wives u

property"); Wyman vs. Wallace, 15Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71,72'
(1976), aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980)

(actionfc:I

alienation of affections abolished because predicated upon the
"obsolete" notion that a wife is one of her "husband's chattels").
Moreover, the State of Louisiana refused to recognize an action
alienation of affections because the cause of action at common

I

l~I

[was] in some measure based upon the . • • obsolete idea that the wife is one of the husband's
chattels, and that her companionship, her services and her affections are his property, for
the loss of which, by wrongful inducement on the
part of another man, the husband ought to be
compensated with money.
Moulin vs. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447, 450 (1927).
This Court has the inherent power to take judicial notice of
the evolving social and public policies of our day.

Wyman vs.

of this state allowed one spouse to assert a property right in~
act of sexua~ intercourse with the other spouse, nevertheless, ~I
a property right should not be subect to auction or ransom in th.~
context of alienation litigation. That was precisely the concl~ 0 ·1
of the Iowa Supreme Court in Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.11.•
790, 794 (Iowa 1981.)
(See finding of fact #6 of the trial court
in the present case: "each spouse in a marital relationship is~
titled
benefits
offor digitization
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..

\icillace, 94 i·iash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 454-455 (1980). 4

I t is

painfully self-evident that the social and public policies of
Utah no longer recognize that a wife is the exclusive, unique
property of her husband.

Not only are women no longer the chattels

of their husband, but they have become an influential, intelligent
and powerful force in government, business and academia.

In recent

years, substantially larger numbers of women have become members of
the Utah State Bar Association and more recently have occupied the
benches of various trial courts in this state.

In short, the

public policy of this state jurisdiction no longer recognizes women
as chattels of their husbands, nor even as inferior in any way to
men in general.

The social and public policies upon which an

action for alienation of affections was originally predicated,
therefore, are substantially out-of-step with the controlling
public policy of this state today.
The alienation action may well be the last surviving vestige
in Utah law of the Eighteenth Century anachronism that a wife

4

see also, Utah Code Annotated §78-25-1 (1977); Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 9.
Pursuant to these provisions, this Court has in
the past taken notice of:
(1) the fact that whiskey is intoxicating,
State vs. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P.2d 713 (1932); (2) various
assumptions about the economic realities of family life and affairs,
Utah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 25, 245 P. 381
(1926); (3) the contents of the Bible and the general doctrine of
the Mormon church, including its principle of "celestial marriage,•
Hilton vs. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902); and, (4) the
fact that passengers on railroad trains are shaken, jostled, and
occasionally lerched and jerked as part of the unavoidable operation of trains over grades and around curves.
Morrissey vs. Union
Pacific R. Co., 68 Utah 323, 249 P. 1064 (1926).
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constituted her husband's exclusive property.

5

To refuse to

abolish this action would constitute a substantial abdication of
this Court's responsibility to develop and declare a flexible
pattern of cor:unon law principles in harmony with and sensitive to'

i

the ever-changing needs and realities of modern society.
B.

1

Additional Public Policy Considerations Militate In Favor

In Favor Of Abolition Of Alienation Actions And Substantially Outweight Any Benefits Gained By Preservation Of The Action.
Courts and commentators have recognized a number of substan- I
ti al policy reasons which militate against preservation of an

I
I

action for alienation of affections.

First, the tort is

predic~~:

upon a number of fictitious assumptions concerning the nature of ;
the marital relationship:
Although marriage is valued highly in our society,
the action for alienation of affections unrealistically defines the extent of that value, and the
relationship of the marital partners.
The marriage, as a union of individuals, will inevitably
encounter discordant moments.
Yet, the tort proceeds on the fictitious presumption of a perfectly
harmonious spousal relationship destroyed by the
thoughtless intruder.
This presumption is misleading in two respects.
First, though the defendant may not be totally blameless, he would
ordinarilly not be in such a position had the
marriage been as strong and viable as the presumption suggests. As one judge recently stated,
"any third person who kicks at the cornerstone of
a shaky marriage will not bring it down without
active support from one or both of the parties."
The second reason why the presumption is false
is that it proceeds upon the premise that the enticed spouse has no individual mind or will, but
has allowed himself or herself to be led astray,
to the detriment of the existing marriage.
It
has been argued that since all marriages will
5

The ?tah Leg~slature statutorily abolished the cc:immon law t,,j
property rights which a husband could formerly assert in the coo '
of "personal injury or wrong to his wife," U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1976),
including the husband's right to sue a tortfeasor who injured h'.'
1
wife for loss of consortium.
Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 P. 2d 438, 4' '
(Utah
1979).
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have rough spots, the marriage partners should
be left alone to work out their oroblems and
that those who intervene should be liable.
This
argument, however, erroneously assumes the total
guilt of the third party and the total innocence
of the enticed spouse.
Note, The Suit of Ali_enation of Affections:
Justified Today?
omitted)

Can Its Existence Be

56 N.D.L.Rev. 237, 251 (1980)

(emphasis added).

(footnotes

See also, Bearbower vs. Merry, 266

N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting in part);
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981);
Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 \'lash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980);
Wyman vs. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (1976) (such
fictitious assumptions presume "an inherent fickleness and frailty
in human character to which we do not subscribe").
Second, there is simply no proof that an action for alienation
of affections achieves the purpose it was designed to effectuate,
i.e., the preservation and protection of marriage:
The premise that the existence of the action
does help preserve the marital relationship
has never been documented.
To the contrary,.
an analysis of the action reveals that the
suit has just the opposite result.
First,
public notice of the action destroys the reputation of both spouses.
Even when there is
no sexual misconduct, or when the action is
between relatives, the bringing of the action
serves as public acknowledgement that the
marriage has gone awry.
It is unlikely that
this personal embarrassment will strengthen
or preserve the marital bond. Second, the very
nature of the action serves as a destructive
influence on the marriage. The action tends
to bring out the worst in people. As stated
by one judge, "[a] prime motivation for
bringing the action is often the need of the
plaintiff to vindicate his or her position
and justify one's own past shortcomings."
Greed, revenge, spite and a desire to humiliate
others in sacrifice of one's own dignity seem
inherent in the suit. The plaintiff appears
as an individual engaging in self-degradation
by translating marital values into monetary
terms.
This situation can hardly serve as
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,j

stable marital relationship between two
mature adults.
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections:
Justified Today?
(Emphasis added.)

~an

Its Existence

~

56 N.D.L.Rev. 237, 251-252 (footnotes omitted),

i

See, also, Wyman vs. Wallace, 15 Wash. App.

395, 397, 549 P.2d 71, 73 (1976), aff'd 94 Wash.

2d 99, 615 P.2d

452, 455 (1980); H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the
United States §10.2, at 267 (1968).
Third, overwhelming practical problems of proof of causatioo

j

and damages render an action for alienation of affections suscept::j
to a broad range of injustices:
One inequitable facet of the alienation tort is
the inherent difficulty in determining liability.
In the frequent case today when the marriage has
gone awry, due in part to the plaintiff's conduct, the jury in a case involving extramarital
relations has the task of determining the pursuer and the pursued.
Such a decision would be
difficult for a trained social scientist, much
less for an impressionable-jury in this emotional
setting • • • By their nature, such lawsuits are
susceptible to the inflammatory plea and attitude of the plaintiff directed toward the
scheming defendant, while encouraging a sympathetic jury to reach a verdict on the basis of
passion and prejudice.
Such a scenario has a
great potential for injustice.
The plaintiff's right of redress must also be
balanced against the destructive influence of
damages in the action.
Damage awards in an
alienation of affections suit are difficult
to determine since intangible injuries are involved.
The jury must consider not only the
loss of consortium in setting an award, but
also the injuries done to the plaintiff's
health, reputation and mental state.
These
damages must in turn be mitigated by the lack
of affection between the spouses and the unhappy marital relations before the interference.
Because there is no standard of measurement by which the jury can value these intangible
rights, jury verdicts in this area of the law
are frequently arbitrary and excessive. These
excessive awards are especially unjust in the
many cas~s where the plaintiff sues not out of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-36-

a desire to mend the already torn marriage,
but for vindictive and mercenary reasons.
r;ote, The Suit of Alienation of Affections:
Justified Today?
omitted)

Can Its Existence Be

tl.D.L.Rev. 237, 252-253 (1980)

(footnotes

(emphasis added).

Fourth, the threat of initiating an alienation of affections
action is a powerful tool of extortion:
Weighing heavily against the plaintiff's right
of recompense is the potential for abuse in
the action and the harmful effect the tort
has on innocent people. The injuries suffered
by the publicity of such a suit can frequently
outweigh the injury that caused the action.
Since there exists such potential to damage
reputations, the threat to sue can easiTY-become, in effect, an extortion scheme.
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections:
Justified Today?

Can Its Existence Be

N.D.L.Rev. 237, 253 (1977) (emphasis added).

Courts and commentators have characterized actions for alienation
of affections as "legalized blackmail."

M. Grossman, The New York

Law of Domestic Relations §313 (1947); Wyman vs. Hallace, 15 Wash.
App.

395, 549 P.2d 71, 72 (1976), aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d

452, 455 (1980).
Finally, an alienation of affections action unreasonably, and
perhaps unconstitutionally, interferes with and impinges upon the
defendant's right of privacy.

The United States Supreme Court has

recognized within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, the right of
privacy enjoyed by every citizen.
U.S. 479 (1965).

Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381

This right of privacy is particularly sensitive

in the area of personal and sexual relationships between individuals.
Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

As one commentator

noted:
Regardless of its constitutio~al di~ensions or
its basis in tort law, the privacy interest
in freedom of choice as to emotional and
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-the question whether the alienation of affections action promotes or hinders protection of
that interest is another factor to weigh in
determining the utility of the action.
The
question is almost rhetorical, since even a
cursory evaluation of the tort makes it apparent that the action interferes with this
interest.
The tort undeniably allows society's
intrusion into the emotional and sexual realm··
of another's life.
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections:
Justified Today?
omitted)

56 N.D.L.Rev.

Can Its Existence Be

237, 255 (1980)

(footnotes

(emphasis added).

These public policy considerations substantially militate
against preservation of the alienation of affections action.
short:

In

(1) the action is predicated upon fictitious assumptions

about the nature of the marital relationship; (2) there is simply
no proof that the action achieves the purpose it was designed to
effectuate, i.e., the preservation and protection of marriage;

(3)

1

!

overwhelming practical problems of proof of causation and damages
render an action for alienation of affections susceptivel to a
broad range of injustices;

(4) the threat of initiating an alien~

tion of affections action is a powerful tool of extortion; and,
an alienation of affections action unconstitutionally and

(l.1

unrea~~

ably interferes with and impinges upon the defendant's constitutio:i
rights of sexual privacy.
In its oral ruling after the close of the evidence in the
present case, the trial court expressed essentially three justifr
cations for preservation of the action:

(l ) an alienation actior

creates and preserves respect for the sanctity of marriage; (21
such an action prevents "theft" of the plaintiff's wife by inter
meddling interlopers; and,

(3) the action, if "well-publicized"

will let "everyone ·• . • know that if a case like this comes intc
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court
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1

These justifications are wholly unpersuasive.
First, as noted above, an alienation action in no way preserves the sanctity of marriage.

In fact, it more seriously and

more substantially undermines marriages, often driving the
allegedly alienated spouse completely away from the plaintiff
into a divorce court.

As one court recently noted:

Increasingly, the states reject and renounce the
right of an alienation recovery because the
existence of such a right is itself a slander
on marriage.
As pointed out in Bearbower, 266
N.W. 2d at 137 (dissenting opinion):
Still another [reason for abolishing
this suit] is the peculiar light
which the whole proceeding throws on
the nature of marriage, leaving one
with the conviction that the successful plaintiff has engaged in something
which looks very much like a sale of
his wife's affections. Most significantly of all, the action for alienation is based on psychological
assumptions that are contrary to fact.
Quoting H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations,
§10.2 at 267 (1968).
fund~rmann

vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Iowa 1981).

Second, the notion that an alienation of affections action
will protect against the "theft" of plaintiff's wife, is palpably
absurd and wholly specious.

As the Iowa Supreme Court recently

noted:
The [alienation] action has survived in the
hope that it affords some protection to
existing family relationships. But this
lofty hope has proven illusory. Human experience is that the affections of persons
who are devoted and faithful are not susceptible to larceny--no matter how CUi1rllng
or stealthful. And it is folly to hope any
longer that a married person who has bec?me_
inclined to philander can be preserved w1th1n
an affectionate marriage by the threat of an
alienation suit.
If we did pretend that a
would-be paramour would be thereby dissuaded,
a substitute is likely to be readily found.
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* * *

In the last analysis we think the action
should be abol ishecf because spousal love
is not property which is subject to !_heft.
We do not abolish the action because defendants in such suits, need or deserve our
protection. We certainly do not do so
because of anycFlanging-views on promiscuo_lls
sexual conduct.
It is merely and simply because the plaintiffs in such suits do not
deserve to recover for the loss-or-1r1]i:irY to
"property" which they do not, and cannot,
own.
Fundermann vs. Mikelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791-792, 794 (Iowa
1981).
Finally, the trial court in the case at bar reasoned that
publicity of the present action and plaintiff's success therein
would constitute sufficient public warning to prevent future incidents like the one involved in this litigation.

Such reasoning,

however, cannot sustain the preservation of this action.

Healthy

marriages are simply not made healthier by the threat of a lawsuit.
Likewise, the threat of litigation cannot preserve a troubled
marriage because such a threat in no way
causes of the trouble and discord.

eradicates the

underlyi~

At best, the threat of litiga-

tion compels already troubled marital partners to continue to liR
together in their disharmony.

The social value of such an arrange·

ment does not constitute a sufficient justification for the
preservation of an action for alienation of affections.

See,

Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278, 279-280 (1956)
("The State is not interested in perpetuating a marriage after all
possibility of accomplishing any desirable purpose of such relation·
ship is gone

.").

As Professor Clark noted:

As has been indicated, viable, contented marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer
of the Nineteenth Century melodrama, though
this is what the suit for alienation assumes.
In fact the breakup is the product of many
influences.
It is therefore misleading and
futile
that
the
threat
ofand Library
a damage
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law to
Library.suppose
Funding for digitization
provided
by the Institute
of Museum
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
suit
can Machine-generated
protect OCR,
themaymarital
relationship. ~
contain errors.
-40-

r:. Clark, The La11 of
at 267
f'.2d

l))m<cstic !<elations in the Unit_e_<:!_.States §10.2

(1':16b); see als()_, l-lyr;ian vcs. \icillace, 15 \'iash. App.

71,

74 (1976),

~ff'd,

94 \lash.

2c1 99,

395, 549

615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).

In short, the justifications espoused by the trial court in
this case for preservation of the action are wholly without merit.
The public policy considerations analyzed above have led the
majority of jurisdictions in this country to abolish the common
law action for alienation of affections.
C.

The Majority Of Jurisdictions In This Country Have Abolished

Actions At Law For Recovery Of Money Damages For Alienation Of Affections.
Because the traditional social and public policy assumptions
upon which an alienations action was historically predicated are
inapposite today and in view of the overwhelming public policy
considerations which militate against preservation of the alienation action, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have
abolished all actions at law and suits in equity for alienation of
affections.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-341 (Supp. 1980-1981); Cal.

Civ. Code §43.5 (West 1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-20-202 (1973);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-572b (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 10, §3924 (1974); D.C. Code Encycl. §16-923 (\'lest Supp. 19781979); Ga. Code Ann. §30-109.l

(1980); Ind. Code Ann. §34-4-4-1

(Burns Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat.
Cts.

&

Jud.

§600.2901
Ann.

Ann. tit. 19, §167 (1981); Md.

Proc. Code Ann. §5-30l(a) (1980); Mich. Comp. Laws

(1968)

(Mich. Stat. Ann. §27A.2901 (1980)); llinn. Stat.

§553.02 (West supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. §27-1-601 (1979);

Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.380 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.840 (1979); Va.
Code §8.01-220 (1977);

w.

Va. Code §56-3-2A (Supp. 1980); Wis.
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;1

Six jurisdictions have abolished all alienation actions at
law for the recovery of money damages, without, however, abolishinc
possible alienation suits in equity for injunctive relief.
Code §6-5-331 (1977)

(injunction permitted, see Logan vs.

Ala.
•

Davids~,,

282 Ala. 327, 330, 211 So.2d 461, 463 (1968) ); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§771.01(West1964); 6 N.J. Stat. Ann.

§2A:23-l (West 1952); N.Y.

Civ. Rights Law §80-a (McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.2\
(Page Supp. 1980); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §1001 (Supp. 1980-1981),
In addition, two states have statutorily abolished all alienation
actions or suits with but insignificant exceptions.

Okla. Stat.

Ann. tit. 76, §8.l (West Supp. 1980-1981) (action permitted only
if spouse was incompetent or minor at time. of alleged alienation);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, §170 (Purdon 1965) (action permitted only
if defendant is a blood relative of plaintiff).
Two jurisdictions have abolished by judicial decision all
alienation actions and suits.

Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99,

6 The policy statement in the preamble to Florida's statute
abolishing alienation of affections actions provides:
Whereas, the remedies provided for by law for
the enforcement of actions based upon alleged
alienation of affections have been subjected
to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary
damage to many persons wholly innocent and
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the
victim of circumstances, and such remedies
having been exercised by unscrupulous persons
for their unjust enrichment and such remedies
having furnished vehicles for the commission
or attempted commission of crime and in many
cases having resulted in the perpetration of
frauds, exploitation and blackmail, it is
hereby declared as the public policy of the
State of Florida that the best interest of the
people of the State will be served by the
abolition of such remedies.
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615 P.2c: 452,
791

455 (J'J80); f'unrlen·.ilnn ·1s. 'iickelson, 304 :l.l'/.2d 790,

(Io"13 1981).

1>cic:ctionall:;, the: State of Louisiana r.as never

recognizC"ci the alienation tort.
169, 178, 115 So.

447, 451

:1oul~ri

vs. Monteleone, 165 La.

(1927), accorc!,

So.2d 787, 788 (La. App. 1979).

Ohl_~usen

vs. Brown,

572

The Alaska Supreme Court has

apparently never considered whether an alienation action obtains
in that state--neither case law nor statutory provisions regarding
the issue exist.
Three jurisdictions, although retaining the tort, view it with
disfavor.
Sh.

Ferriter vs. Daniel O'Connell's Son,

2075, 413 N.E.2d 690, 694 (1980)

Inc., 80 Mass. Adv.

(alienation actions disfavored);

Dube vs. Rochette, 110 N.H. 129, 130, 262 A.2d 288, 289 (1970)
(actions susceptible to abuse, but legislative judgment to allow
continuance of action would be respected); Thompson vs. Chapman,
93 N.M. 356, 358, 600 P. 2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) cert.
denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979)

(appellete court would

abolish tort if it had authority to do so).
Three states have shortened their statute of limitations on
alienation actions to one year.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §37-201 (Bobbs-

Merrill Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §413.140(1) (c) (BobbsMerrill Supp. 1980)

(includes alienation actions, see, Skaggs vs.

Stanton, 532 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1975); R.I. Gen. Law §9-1-14
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980).
Finally, four states employ substantially difficult burdens
of proof in alienation actions.
(Hawaii 1979)
Kan.

21,

Hunt vs. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123

(5-prong burden of proof); Long vs. Fischer, 210

25-26, 499 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1972)

(5-prong test for

burden of proof); Thompson vs. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 358, 600 P.2d
302, 303-304
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979) cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593
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P. 2d 1078 (1979))

(plaintiff must show existence of affection ano

that defendant maliciously caused alienation by direct

interfe~n~

Heist vs. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 523, 265 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1980)
(plaintiff must show existence of genuine love and that malicious
acts of defendant produced loss).
In short, 28 states have abolished alienation actions at
for the recovery of money damages.

If Alaska, Pennsylvania and

Oklahoma are included, the total number of jurisdictions
this tort is 31.

I~

abolish!~

To the extent that the term "common law" implies

law common to a majority of the jurisdictions of this country, it i
cannot be said, in view of the fact that 31 of the 50 states haw
abolished alienation actions, that such an action remains a part
of American common law.
In Cahoon vs. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), this
Court noted that it would not look to or recognize the common law
of England, to which an action for alienation of affections traces
its origin, in those situations where English common law was not
"suitable to our conditions, morals, history and background."
Cahoon, supra, 342 P.2d at 98.

Rather, this Court noted

in~

that it would look "to the system of common law and equity which
prevails in and has been and is now being developed by the

decis~

of this country," and would "reject the common law of England whicr.
is not suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or ideas.•
supra, 342 P.2d at 98 (emphasis added).

-

Cahoon,

It should be noted that virtually all of the jurisdictions
which have abolished the tort of alienation of affections have
done so in the past ten years and that the Utah Supreme Court ha 5
not had the opportl'.nity to consider a case of alienation of auctions
since
and
Sadleir
cited
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1

In vi~~ of the overwhelming rejection by American jurisdictions
of

the tort of alienation of affections and based upon the authority

of Cahoon,

this Court should, pursuant to its power and authority

to interpret and declare the common la~ of this state, abolish all
actions for recovery of money damages predicated upon an alleged
alienation of affections.
D.

This Court Has The Inherent Power To Abolish The Tort Of

Alienation Of Affections.
It is beyond dispute that the tort of alienation of affections
is a judicially-created doctrine in this state.
Oldroyd, l

Utah 2d 362,

267 P.2d 759 (1954).

See, Wilson vs.

I t is also beyond

dispute that this Court has the inherent power to interpret and
declare the common law of this jurisdiction.

Part and parcel of

that authority is the power to create new causes of action, see,
e.g., Ernest
1979)

w.

Hahn,

Inc. vs. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah

(cause of action sounding in strict tort liability recognized

for injuries resulting from defective products), and to abolish
antiguated common law doctrines which have ceased to serve the
purpose for which they were originally created by the judiciary.
See, Jacobsen Construction Co. vs. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.,
619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980)

(common law doctrine of "assumption of

risk" abolished; plaintiff's culpable conduct to be determined
henceforth with reference to comparative negligence principles).
As noted above, two jurisdictions have judicially abolished alienation actions.
(1980),

In \lyman vs. \lallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452

the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged its inherent

authority to interpret and declare the common law of that jurisdiction and hence to abolish alienation actions:
No doubt has ever been expressed regarding the
courts' power to abolish this judicially
created action for alienation of a spouse's
affections.
Our original decision in this case
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recognized that "a rule of law which has its
origin in the common law and which has not been
specifically enacted by the legislature may be
modified or abolished by the courts when such
revision is mandated by changed conditions."
[Citations omitted.]
Every jurisdiction that
has thus far abolished the tort of alienation
of a spouse's affections has done so legislatively.
However, the mere fact that the
legislatures in these other states abolished
the cause of action before the question of
abolition was properly presented to the respective courts, does not mean that every state
court must wait for the legislature to focus
its attention on this subject.
[Citations-omitted.]
In the instant case, the question
of abolition of the action has been squarely
presented to the courts of this state and,
since the action was created judicially, the
courts have the power to resolve this question.
Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 453-454 (1980)
(emphasis added).
On May 7, 1981, the Supreme Court of Iowa also abolished
alienation actions in that jurisdiction.

Noting that an "unmis- ,

takable trend away from allowing alienation suits" exists in this
country, the Iowa Supreme Court observed:
It is sometimes suggested that the abrogation
of a right, even a common-law right, should
come from the legislature rather than from
the courts.
This suggestion was already laid
to rest in Bearbower [vs. Merry, 266 N.W.2d
128 (Iowa 1978)].
In Bearbower, though we
were in wide disagreement on the underlying
and fundamental issue in the case, we were
unanimous in believing it was for us and not
for the legislature to end the right of this
recovery if it were to be ended.
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1981) {emphas!'
added).

7

See also, Doe vs. Doe, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1412, 390 N.W.i,

7

Iowa law is, in general, similar to the law of this sta~.
and distinguished members of this Court have of ten looked to t~
law of Iowa as persuasive authority upon unsettled issues in thiO
jurisdiction.
See, Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2o
278, 281 (1956)----nfenriod, J., dissenting).
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~30,

732-733 (1979)

(Supreme Juclicial Court of ilass2chusetts has

lnherent power to jurlicially abolish alienation of affections tort).
In short, this Court has inherent power to abolish actions
for alienation of affections.

Moreover, the doctrine of stare

dccisis is not an impediment to abolition.

Noting that "[t)he

genius of the common law is its flexibility and capacity for growth
and adaptation" the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine
of stare decisis could not undermine its obligation "to abandon
antiquated doctrines and concepts."

Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304

t:.ll.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1981).
This Court long ago recognized, "that the doctrine of stare
decisis is not an inflexible rule, and that there are occasions
where it becomes the duty of the court to re-examine questions
involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny."
vs. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 7, 9 (1899).

Kimball
Specifi-

cally, the court in Kimball noted that:
[w)here, however, there has been but a single
decision, which is clearly erroneous, and
important private or public rights are concerned •
. the doctrine of stare decisis
ought not to be applied, so as to prevent a
reconsideration of the former.
~·

57 P. at 8 (emphasis added).
There are but two decisions in this state which have directly

recognized and upheld a cause of action based upon alleged alienation of affections. 8

Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d

759 (1954); Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278 (1956).
Por over two decades, this Court has not considered the continued
viability of actions for alienation of affections.

It is defendant's

8
rn Cahoon vs. ,Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959),
plaintiff brought an iction for both alienation of affections and
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
FundingCourt's
for digitization provided
by the Institute
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and Library
Services
criminalSponsored
conversation.
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in
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treated
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f

I

,

~I

position that these two cases are "clearly erroneous" for our day,
and the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent
and abolition of the same.

reconsiderati~

Kimball vs. City of Grantsville, 19

Utah 368, 57 P. 7, 8 (1899).
From the foregoing,

it is self-evident that the social and

policy considerations upon which the alienation action was originally founded, are outdated and inconsistent with modern ideas

a~

beliefs concerning the rights of women and the nature of the
marital relationship.

Moreover, the overwhelming public policy

considerations referred to above suggest that the alienation

actio~I

does not achieve the ends it was originally designed to achieve
and, far worse, serves as a tool of extortion and fraud.

So

persuasive are these considerations that a majority of jurisdiction;•
in this country have abolished alienation actions.

No impediment,

including the doctrine of stare decisis, prevents this Court from
abolishing alienation actions in this jurisdiction.

Justice

Henriod recognized the persuasiveness of the policy reasons set
forth above which militate in favor of abolishing the alienation
tort:
So fraught with chance for fraud, and so distasteful as to type of litigation are suits to
recover money for the alienation of a wife's
affections, that fourteen states have taken
steps, to outlaw such litigation, including the
state to the east and the one to the west of us.
Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278, 282 (1956) (dissenting opinion)

(footnote omitted).

Justice Henriod also suggest'i

in that opinion the position which defendant urges this Court

n~

to take; namely, "to relegate this type of litigation to oblivion·
Id.

contain some dicta regarding a husband• s right to maintain an act
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
for
alienation
of his
wife's
affections.
Id., 342 P.2d at 99,
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-48-

I

POIU'l'

II

THE '~RIAL COtJ:<.T 'S UL'l'I'tATE DETERMILIATIO:J OF
LIABILITY AtlD FitlDitiGS OF'Fl\CT ARE \/HOLLY
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.

It is the law of this jurisdiction that on appeal, the trial
court's findings of fact are entitled to some degree of deference
from this Court.

The trial court's findings, however, must be

supported by substantial evidence:
The rules of appellate review generally preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial court on factual
issues.
However, the trial court is bound
to make factual determinations to support its
legal conclusions and said findings must be
supported by substantial evidence.
Hidden Meadows Development Co. vs. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1250
(Utah 1979) (emphasis added).
Not only must the trial court's findings be supported by substantial evidence, but they must also be specific and detailed:
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a
judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end
the findings should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
tF!eSteps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reach~d.
[Ci tat ions
omitted.]
The rule as stated in Prows vs.
Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31, 33 (1928) is:
that until the court has found on all
the material issues raised by the
pleadings, the findings are insufficient to support a judgment; and that
findings should be sufficiently distinct
and certain as not to require an
investigation or review tOCfetermine
what issues were decided.
Rucker vs. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (Utah 1979) (emphasis
added).
It is self-evident that "it is not the function of an appellate
by thefindings
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the
Institute
of Museum and Library
Services at 1338
court toSponsored
make
of Funding
fact."
Rucker
vs.
Dalton,
supra,
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I'I

(Utah 1979).

Therefore, unless the findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence; are complete, accurate and consistent;
and

are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts

to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached,

"application of the proper rule of law

is difficult, if not impossible, and the reviewing function of this,
Court is seriously undermined."

Rucker, supra, at 1339.

Unlike its findings of fact, the trial court's conclusions of
law are not entitled to special deference on appeal.

In short,

this Court may make its own determinations with respect to the lo
applicable to the established facts.

See, Hardy vs. Hendrickson,

27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972).
In the present case, of course, if the trial court's

findin~

of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, defendant is
entitled to reversal.

If this Court concludes that the findings

are incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent, defendant is entitled
to reversal and remand for a new trial for the purpose of

allowi~

the parties to present sufficient evidence to enable the trial
court to make complete, competent findings.
Mindful of these propositions and the burden he bears on
appeal, it is defendant's position that the trial court's ultimate determination of liability and findings of fact are wholly
unsupported in three particulars, to-wit:

(1)

plaintiff failed to

sustain his burden of proving that defendant wilfully and intentionally alienated Brenda's affections for plaintiff;

( 2) the tric-

court's findings regarding compensatory damages are unsupported~
the evidence, excessive and based upon improper considerations,
including passion and prejudice; and,

( 3) the trial court's fin3-

ings regarding punitive damages are unsupported by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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excessive, and based upon improper considerations •

eviden~·

A.

£_}~1_n_t_iff

~efendant

Failed To Sustain His flurclen Of Proving __!ha_!:_

Intentionally And \iilfully Alienated Brenda's Affections

For Plaintiff.
Although some jurisdictions have declined to abolish alienation litigation, nevertheless, because of the overwhelming historical, social and public policy considerations referred to in Point I
above, many states which have retained alienation actions have
intensified plaintiff's burden of proof.

The purposes, of course,

of increasing plaintiff's burden of proof are to eliminate some of
the abuses inherent in this kind of litigation and to eliminate
some of the difficulties associated with proof of causation and
damages in the typical alienation action.

Of the varied approaches

of other jurisdictions in this regard, the approach of Kansas and
Hawaii is the most persuasive because it is most likely to achieve
the purpose

of eliminating abuse and the problem

of proving

causation and damages.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held in Long vs. Fischer, 210 Kan.
21,

499 P.2d 1063 (1972), that to maintain a cause of action for

alienation of affections, plaintiff has the following burden of
proof:

(1)
The defendant must have exercised improper,
willful and malicious influence on the wayward
spouse in derogation of the plaintiff's marital
rights.
(2)
The wayward spouse must not have voluntarily
accepted defendant's advances at the outset of
the affair.
( 3)
The wayward spouse must not hc:ive ac~i vely
contributed to the procuration by intent:onally
seeking the companionship and the affection of
the defendant.
(4)
The plaintiff must prove he or she was not
at fault in causing the other spouse's affections to .stray.
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(5)
The willful and malicious influence of the
defendant on the wayward spouse must be proven
as the procuring cause of the loss of the love
and affection which the wayward spouse formerly
held for the plaintiff.
Id., 499 P. 2d at 1067 (emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court

of Hawaii recently adopted the Kansas standard.

Hunt vs. Chang,

594 P.2d 118, 124 (Hawaii 1979).
For the reasons outlined above, this Court should adopt the
Kansas standard.

If that standard was applied to the facts of the

present case, defendant would be entitled to reversal upon four
independent grounds.

First, assuming arguendo that plaintiff

proved at trial that defendant exercised improper and wilful influence over Brenda, in derogation of plaintiff's marital rights,
nevertheless, plaintiff wholly failed to establish that defendant ,
made any advances to Brenda and he failed to establish that

Bren~

did not voluntarily accept any such advances at the outset of the
affair.

There is virtually no evidence in the record to conclusivelf

establish that defendant made improper advances to Brenda.

No one

witnessed any physical contact between plaintiff and Brenda

thro~~

out the time period at issue in this litigation.

Moreover, most~I

the contacts between defendant and Brenda were in the presence of
other persons, including plaintiff.

Both defendant and Brenda

testified that they did not engage in any kind of misconduct of a
sexual nature.

Although plaintiff testified concerning two con-

versations he had with Brenda regarding her alleged "sexual
involvement" with defendant, no testimony was adduced at trial wi~
respect to who initiated the alleged sexual relationship between
them.

Finally, even if the trial court's ultimate determination

with respect to liability could be deemed to be an implicit findin1
that defendant, not Brenda, initiated the sexual relationship,
nevertheless,
there
isFunding
absolutely
that
Brenda refused,
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at the outset,

to voluntarily accept defendant's alleged advances.

Tn the contrary,

there is substantial evidence that Brenda initi-

ated the majority of contacts between herself and defendant.

(See

he low.)
Second, there is substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence
that Brenda actively and voluntarily contributed to defendant's
alleged procuration of her affections for plaintiff by intentionally
soliciting the companionship and affection of defendant.

The trial

court failed to find as fact the date upon which Brenda's alleged
relationship with defendant began.

The only testimony at trial on

this issue, however, clearly indicates that their relationship
began at a New Year's Eve party on December 31, 1978 and January 1,
1979.

According to defendant, although she may have been under the

influence of alcohol, Brenda approached him regarding going to bed
with her.

There was no evidence whatsoever at trial that defendant

solicited contact with Brenda on this occasion.

Moreover, defendant

testifieq that approximately one week after the New Year's Eve
party, Brenda came to his home.

There was no evidence to suggest

that defendant invited Brenda's presence there.

In fact, to the

contrary, the evidence suggested that 3renda had been physically
abused by plaintiff and had sought refuge and safety at defendant's
home.
From January to June of 1979, Brenda went to defendant's home
on at least 20 occasions.

There was no evidence to suggest that

Brenda went to defendant's home pursuant to his invitation or
request.

To the contrary, the evidence clearly indicated that

Brenda went to plaintiff's home on these occasions because she had
been physically abused by plaintiff; she had been badgered by
plaintiff's parents~ or, she and her girlfriends had nothing better
to do.
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Plaintiff's testimony in this regard is revealing.

Plain-

tiff pecifically characterized the nature of Brenda and defendant',
relationship as one in which "she was seeing him."

Plaintiff

testified that Brenda told him "she had been seeing Jeff."

al~

----Neithe'.

plaintiff nor Brenda characterized Brenda's relationship with defendant as one in which defendant had initiated the advances or
contacts, or as one in which defendant was seeing Brenda.

In

short, the overwhelming evidence at trial clearly establishes that,
from December 31, 1978 to October of 1979, Brenda intentionally

a~

voluntarily sought defendant's companionship and affection.
Third, the overwhelming evidence presented at trial clearly
established that plaintiff's conduct significantly contributed to
the alienation of Brenda's affections.

A complete review of the

evidence outlined above is not necessary here.

By his own admis-

sions, plaintiff slapped Brenda and pushed her to the ground on at
least one occasion.

Mature, dedicated and loving marital partnen

simply do not physically assault each other.

The conflict in the

testimony below was not if plaintiff assaulted Brenda, it was
how many times.

In that regard, defendant, Linda Springer and

Brenda's father testified regarding numerous occasions on which
they had seen Brenda physically battered and abused following
altercations with plaintiff.

Brenda also gave extensive

regarding plaintiff's abuse of her.

testimon~

On the occasion on which

plaintiff admitted slapping and pushing Brenda to the ground,
defendant, Brenda and her father gave substantial testimony with
respect to the serious nature of her injuries.

Finally, Linda

Springer and Brenda herself testified that plaintiff's conduct in
continually abusing and battering Brenda was the primary factor i:
alienating Brenda's affections for plaintiff.
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Morcoi,._::, plai 11tiff hacl a

SCic:cc

alcohol probler~ during the

Plaintiff's repeated drinking
often precipitated the acts of physical abuse regarding which
various witnesses testified at trial.

Plaintiff was fired from

his trucking job in substantial part because of his alcohol abuse.
Plaintiff's own marital infidelity eventually became a serious

,

issue in his marriage to Brenda.

nd

with Brenda regarding his contacts with other \/omen.

Plaintiff admitted confrontations
Evidence was

adduced at trial that plaintiff spent substantial time periods
alone with other

wo~en.

If opportunity alone

~as

the primary

criterion for measuring marital infidelity, then plaintiff, like
Brenda, could not escape the charge of adultery.
The realities of the marital relationship dictate that a husband cannot long physically batter and abuse his wife and expect

·s

her to ''love, honor and obey" him.

Moreover, serious recurrent

abuses of alcohol erode, if not eradicate, reciprocal spousal respect and affection.

In short, plaintiff's long history of victimizing

Brenda, as a matter of law, must be deemed to be a substantial, if
not the primary cause of the alienation of Brenda's affections for
him.
lj

Fourth, assuming arguend~ that defendant exercised improper
and willful influence over Brenda, in derogation of plaintiff's
marital rights, there is absolutely no proof that defendant's
conduct was the "procuring cause" of the loss of love and affection
which Brenda formerly held for plaintiff.

This conclusion logi-

cally follows from the facts that Brenda voluntarily and intentionally
I~

sought defendant's companionship and affection and that plaintiff
himself was the primary cause in alienating Brenda's affections
for him.
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,i

In short, if this Court adopts the Kansas standard, the causr:
must be reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for defendant.

The evidence below clearly indicates that

plaintiff wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof.

But even

if this Court declines to adopt the more stringent Kansas

standa~,

reversal is nevertheless required because plaintiff failed to
sustain his burden of proof under Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d
3 6 2' 2 6 7 p. 2d 7 5 9 (19 5 4) •

In Wilson, this Court held that the

essential elements of a cause of action for alienation of affections are:
(a) The fact of marriage; (b) that the defendant wilfully and intentionally, (c) alienated
the wife's affections, (d) resulting in the
loss of the comfort, society and consortium
of the wife, and (e) (to justify punitive
damages) a charge of malice.
Id., 267 P.2d at 763.
In Wilson, however, this Court also approved two jury
tions, the substance of which clearly indicated that:

( l)

instru~

if

plaintiff's own conduct, as opposed to the conduct of defendant,
is the primary cause of the alienation of his spouse's affections
for him, then plaintiff may not recover; and,

(2) if the allegedly

alienated spouse initiated the relationship between herself and
defendant, or affirmatively sought his love and companionship,
then defendant can not be found liable.

Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l

Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 768 (1954).
It is an essential element of a cause of action for alienatior:
of affections that plaintiff prove he and his spouse enjoyed

tr~

love and affection prior to the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.

In Heist vs. Heist, 265 S.E.2d 434 (N.C. App. 1980), the

court elaborated upon this requirement:
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In order to sustain a cause of action for
alienation of affections, the plaintiff must

s l~ o " th c fol l ,:i-.1 in g Ea ct s :
( 1) _:_~-,3 t she 2'.:d her hus~J<:ir1d were happily
married and that a genuine love and affection
ex is tecl be t"·:ee_r:i__~hem;

(2) that the love and affection so existing
was alienated and destroyed;
(3) that the wrongful and malicious acts of
defendant produced and brought about the loss
and alienation of such love and affection.
Warner vs. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384, 163
S.E.2d 90 (1968).
i!eist vs. Heist,

265 S.E.2d 434, 436 (N.C. App. 1980).

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that defenda~t's conduct was
active, willful and intentional.
438, 139 So.

458, 460-461

See, Stanton vs. Cox, 162 Miss.

(1932).

The Supreme Court of Tennessee

stated this requirement as follows:
The weight of authority is that in alienation
suits the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant is the enticer--the active or
aggressive party.
If it develops that the
plaintiff's spouse was merely bent on the
gratification of lust, was not particular in
the choice of a guilty partner, plaintiff's
case is not made out.
Likewise we think plaintiff's case would fail if it should appear
that for any other reason the plaintiff's
spouse was the pursuer rather than the pursued.
[Citations omitted.)
Wilson vs. Bryant, 167 Tenn. 107, 113, 67 S.W.2d 133, 135 (1933).
See

~~so

(1956)

Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 29, 296 P.2d 278, 280

(defendant's conduct must be the primary cause of the

alleged alienation).
With respect to what constitutes sufficient evidence of
defendant's conduct to justify a finding that he wilfully and intentionally alienated the affections of plaintiff's spouse, the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico held as follows:
The loss of the society, companionship, fellowship, coifort, conjugal affections an~ support
ofby the
the
husband,
when
caused
byby the
any
person
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maliciously invading the hallowed precincts of
the home, and without justification severing
the ties which bind the husband and wife together, from which a separation flows, is
tortious, and the person who does so may be
required to respond in damages.
But the burden
is upon the plaintiff to show that the opposite
spouse did love and had affection for him or
her, as the case may be, and that the defendant
maliciously caused the alienation thereof by
direct interference~--[Emphasis in original. J

* * *
[E)vidence of sexual intercourse between defendant
and plaintiff'~ wife does not alone constitute
proof that defendant was blameable [sic) or had
the necessary willful intent • . • for imposition
of liability in an action for alienation of
affections.
[Citation omitted.)
The crucial
issue is whether the defendant was the "aggressor."
[Citation omitted.]
Thompson vs. 'Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302, 303-304 (Ct. App.
(1979), cert. deniec:l_, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979) (emphasis
added).
Finally, of those jurisdictions which retain alienation actioo•
it appears to be the majority rule that plaintiff's conduct cannot
be a cause of the alienation of his wife's affections.

Annot.,

Element of Causation in Alienation of Affections Action, 19 A.L.R.2d
471, 493 (1951), as supplemented, 1981; Comment, Piracy on the
Matrimonial Seas--The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L. J.
594, 604-605 (1971).
Based upon Wilson and the authorities cited above, it is
apparent that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof in
this case.

The above analysis of the Kansas standard, many of the

elements of which are recognized under Utah law, is equally applicable here.

Moreover, the above authorities yield two additional

grounds in support of defendant's position that plaintiff failed
to sustain his burden of proof at trial.
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First,

there i3 simply no evirlencc that pla1Dtiff and Brenda

w· re happilv narrierl or that the; enjoyed a "genuine love and

a•fection" prior to the time of any alleged conduct of defendant.
It is undisputed that plainti[f, on frequent occasions, became upset with Brenda and telephoned her father "to come and get her."
On at least one occasion, after becoming upset with her and after
pushing her around, plaintiff told Brenda to leave their home.
Linda Springer testified that plaintiff and Brenda had problems in
their marriage long before they were introduced to defendant and
Brenda herself testified that plaintiff had communicated to her in
August or September of 1978 that he wanted a divorce.

Plaintiff's

conduct in continually "needling" Brenda and in repeatedly battering and abusing her completely belies his self-serving statement
that he wanted his marriage to work "if possible."

Finally,

plaintiff's unequivocal statement, communicated during the heat of
one of his many alcoholic rages, that he hated Brenda, was among
the clearest and most convincing evidence of the nature of plaintiff and Brenda's reciprocal marital affections.

In short, "[w]hat

was in the store before it was burglarized at least sets a limit to
what could have been burglarized."
198, 204,

Alaimo vs. Schwanz, 56 Wis.2d

201 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1972).

Second,

the evidence introduced at trial with respect to

defendant's conduct does not clearly establish that he was the
aggressor, the pursuer, or the active party in procuring the
alienation of Brenda's former affections for her husband.

In this

regard, even assuming that the evidence presented by plaintiff
regarding Brenda's sexual involvement with defendant is sufficient
to support the trial court's finding of fact in this regard, nevertheless, evidence of sexual intercourse between defendant and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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i
was blameable [sic) or had the necessary willful intent . . . for
imposition of liability in an action for alienation of affections.'·
Thompson, 600 P.2d at 304.

This proposition is especially true in

the present case where both defendant and Brenda specifically
denied any sexual misconduct during the time period in issue in
this case, and where, as here, no other evidence of any kind of
misconduct whatsoever was introduced at trial.
Whether this Court adopts the Kansas standard or adheres to
the standard of Wilson vs. Oldroyd, as supplemented by the authoriti{
cited above, plaintiff clearly failed to establish at trial a cauRI
of action for alienation of affections.
B.

The Trial Court's Award Of Compensatory Damages Is Un-

supported By The Evidence, Excessive, And Was Based Upon Passion
And Prejudice.
In Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976),
plaintiff brought an alienation action against defendant.

The

only evidence of damage introduced at trial was plaintiff's testimony that he was "emotionally shocked and hurt by his wife's defection."

The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages in the

amount of $17,500.

After discussing its aversion and reluctance

to interfere with jury damage awards, the Supreme Court of
concluded that

0

Wis~Mh

where the award reflects injuries not proved or a

rate of compensation beyond reason, this court can find the damages
excessive even in the absence of [fact finder]

perversity."

vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1976).
The court in Roach noted that:
the plaintiff demonstrated no pecuniary damage
whatsoever; no evidence was introduced to show
that he lost wages or incurred medical expenses,
or that the divorce settlement resulted in
additional financial burdens • . • Nor is there
heprovided
suffered
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Quinneyevidence
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~

1

reputation as a

result of che K~ane affair.

The sole evidence of i~jur~ was his own
testimony_ that he bad-i'icen- emotionally shocke'.l
and hurt by his w1~c 's clefection.
However, 0n
aggregate awarcl of $17,500 in compensatory
damages for his injurecl feelings reflects a
"rate of compensation which is beyoGd reason"
Id.,

243 N.W.2d at 517 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of

\lisconsin reduced plaintiff's compensatory daDages from $17,500
to $500.
iti{

sent case which justifies the trial court's award of $59,600 in
compensatory damages.
whatsoever.

Plaintiff demonstrated no pecuniary damage

He did not introduce evidence to demonstrate that he

lost wages or incurred medical expenses, or that his divorce settlement with Brenda resulted in additional financial burdens.

Plain-

tiff did introduce some evidence that his trucking job did not
offer as much income as the first job he voluntarily quit.
trial court made no findings,

The

however, that defendant's conduct had

any impact whatsoever on plaintiff's voluntary termination from his
first job.

;in

~s

There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record of the pre-

,

.

Moreover,

it is undisputed that plaintiff was fired

from his second job because of his own misconduct.
Furthermore, plaintiff specifically told Brenda that he was
quitting his first job because he did not enjoy working in a coal
mine.

Finally, plaintiff's mother testified at trial that, as of

the date of trial, plaintiff had returned ~o work at his first job.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot rely upon his testimony
that he earned less money as a truck driver than he did in the
coal mine, to support the court's compensatory damage award of

$59,600.
Not only did plaintiff wholly fail to introduce any evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of embarrassment, humiliation, loss of social standing or reputation, or loss of the comfort, society and consortium of his wife.
Indeed, plaintiff even failed to introduce evidence that he was
emotionally hurt as a result of defendant and Brenda's conduct, the
minimum quantum of evidence required in Roach to sustain the court's!
reduction to $500 of plaintiff's jury verdict.

To sustain the

trial court's award of compensatory damages in the present case,
I

based upon plaintiff's meagre evidentiary showing, would constitute I
a substantial perversion of the integrity of this State's judicial
system.
Even if the record in this case is deemed to contain evidence
in support of the trial court's award of compensatory damages, such
award was clearly excessive.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin

recognized in Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976),1
that the determination of a jury with respect to damages in an
alienation action should not lightly be disturbed.

I

Notwithstanding•

that recognition, the court in Roach concluded that when the rate
of compensation is beyond reason, "this court can find the damages
excessive even in the absence of [fact finder)

perversity."

Roach,

243 N.W.2d at 517.
In Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 326, 267 P.2d 759 (1954),
after noting that in alienation litigation, "the amount of

dam~Y

must be determined largely upon the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case," this Court concluded:
This does not mean that whenever one points his
finger at another and accuses him of a real or
fancied violation of his rights that a jury
should be allowed to impose liability; nor,
even that if a wrong has actually been committed,
a jury must be given the privilege of dividing
up the defendant's property with the plaintiff.
It is and must be the responsibility of courts
to determlne in the first instance whether there
isS.J. aQuinney
reasonable
basis
uponby the
which
a jury
could
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i

pl~1ntiff which woul~ forra the basis of recovery;
and l1kew1se to apply the general yardstick of
"what reasonable men could find" to any damage
a»1arded as compensation for an injury.
If the
verdict transgresses that limit so that it can
properly be saicl-that_it_is so grossly excessive
tha~ it must have been inspired by passion or
preJudice, or by spite, envy, ill will or corrup
t1on'. as contrasted with reason and justice, the
verdict cannot be permitted to stand.

sl
Id.,

267 P.2d at 764 (emphasis added).
In the present case, this Court should be substantially less

hesitant to modify the award of compensatory damages than the
Court was in Wilson or than the Wisconsin Supreme Court was in
Roach, because the lower court, not a jury, determined the amount
of plaintiff's award.

The value of preserving the American tradi-

tion of jury trials in civil cases will not be eroded by this

1,I

Court's more careful scrutiny of the trial court's award of
compensatory damages.
In the present case, plaintiff's only evidence of damage at

g

trial was the ultimate fact that Brenda is no longer his wife and
the inference that she is no longer in a position to provide him
with the benefits of consortium.

Based upon the authorities cited

above, it is axiomatic that defendant cannot be found liable for
this "damage" to plaintiff if the latter's conduct was the proximate
cause of the damage, or if Brenda voluntarily sought defendant's
companionship and affections.

Because the evidence clearly

establishes that plaintiff's conduct was the primary proximate
cause of the alienation of his wife's affections, and because the
evidence clearly indicates that Brenda affirmatively and voluntarily
sought defendant's companionship and affection, the trial court's
compensatory damage award cannot stand.
Moreover,

it is axiomatic that defendant cannot be required

to paySponsored
compensatory
damages in excess of the value to plaintiff of
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his and Brenda's reciprocal marital affections immediately prior to
the time of defendant's alleged wrongful interference therewith.
The present case clearly indicates that from a point in time early
in their marriage, plaintiff and Brenda did not enjoy reciprocal
love and affection.

The trial court's award of compensatory damages,

therefore, is excessive and cannot be supported.
If this Court determines that consortium itself, no matter how
unhappy and broken the marriage, is of some minimal, judicially
cognizable value, then the trial court's award of compensatory
damages could only be sustained if it were reduced by many

thousa~s

of dollars to reflect the other considerations referred to above.
Such a determination, however, would appear to be substantially
inconsistent with this Court's position in Tjas vs. Proctor, 591
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979), that a husband may not recover for loss
of consortium in the context of negligent injury to his wife.

In

view of all these considerations, it would appear that this Court
should reduce the trial court's award of compensatory damages to
an amount not greater than $500, the amount which appeared to adequately compensate the plaintiff in Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524,.
243 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1976).
I

Finally, it appears that the trial court's award of compensato1
damages was motivated by passion and prejudice.

In Wilson vs.

Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954), this Court

not~

that the indicia of passion and prejudice may be shown by "anything affirmatively done or said by the judge or jury

In

the present case, the lower court's statements at the conclusionof
trial indicate some degree of passion and/or prejudice.

The court

orally chastised defendant for stealing Brenda from plaintiff a~
for interfering wi t:h "the whole basic fabric of society."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

d~fendant rlidn't steal

Brenda, Brenda left plaintiff because he was

an alcoholic and he abused and battered her.

It almost goes with-

out saying that there is no evidence that defendant interfered with
the whole basic fabric of society.
But more importantly, the trial court's statement clearly
indicates that the judgment he intended to award plaintiff against
defendant was calculated to make defendant an example to the entire
community that "if a case like this comes into my Court, that they
can expect to suffer."

(T. 124)

It is axiomatic, however, that

the purpose of an award of compensatory damages is not to make a
public example of defendant nor to publicly condemn his conduct.
The purpose of an award of compensatory damages, of course, is to
compensate plaintiff.

The days of the scarlet letter publicly

displayed upon one's breast have long since slipped into the obscurity of the past.

Moreover, it would constitute an unacceptable

and egregious windfall to award a plaintiff excessive compensatory
damages, not based upon adequate proof at trial, simply because
defendant's conduct was inconsistent with the trial court's personal predilections.
In the present case, it is virtually impossible to determine
whether the trial court's decision to publicly punish defendant and
to condemn his conduct influenced only its finding with respect to
punitive damages.

In ~, this Court held that the amount of

damages awarded by the fact finder is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence of passion or prejudice to justify reversal.
vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954).

Wilson

In the

present case, however, it is not the amount of the compensatory
damages which alone renders the trial court's award suspect, it is
that amount coupled with the trial court's impassioned statements
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and the total lack of evidence in the record to support the award
which renders the same virtually unsustainable.

In short, the

obvious prejudice reflected in the lower court's post-trial statements tainted not only its award of punitive damages, but also its
award of compensatory damages.

(See below. )

Because the trial court's award of compensatory damages in
this case was unsupported by the evidence, excessive, and motivated, at least in part, by passion and prejudice, this Court
should modify the award.

For the reasons stated above, a compen-

satory award in an amount not exceeding $500 would be both generou
and reasonable.

In the alternative, this Court should reverse

t~

cause and remand the same for a new trial.
C.

The Trial Court's Award Of Punitive Damages Is Unsupported

By The Evidence, Excessive, And Was Based Upon Improper Considerations.
This Court is free to liberally review and modify an award of
punitive damages:
Punitive damages are awarded on the theory that
it is permissible in cases of certain aggravated
wrongs to permit the private litigant, in the
public interest, to impose a penalty upon the
defendant as a punishment and to deter others
from engaging in similar offenses.
The reasons
why the jury and the trial judge are particularly
advantaged to fix compensatory damages are much
less cogent here.
For this reason we feel more
at liberty to review and modify the award as to
punitive damages.
Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 766 (1954)
(emphasis added).
There are three guidelines which this Court should apply in
reviewing an award of punitive damages:
[Punitive damages] have to fall within the limits
of reason; "must not be so disproportionate to
the injury and the actual damage as to plainly
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manifest that they were the result of passion
and preJudice" and must be correlated with the
othc~ facts and circumstances shown in evidence
including defendant's wealth.
Id.,

267 P. 2d at 766 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
In the context of alienation litigation, wiltul and intentional

conduct on the part of defendant is not alone sufficient to justify
an award of punitive damages.

Punitive damages may only be awarded

in alienation actions if plaintiff clearly and convincingly demonstrates that defendant acted with malice.

Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l

Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 763, 766 (1954); see also, Elkington vs.
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41(Utah1980).
Finally, an award of punitive damages may be reduced by this
Court if the award of compensatory damages upon which the punitive
damages are based appears to be "very substantial."

In Wilson, for

example, plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages in the amount
of $50,000.

The jury also awarded plaintiff punitive damages

against defendant in the amount of $25,000.

The facts in Wilson

stronqly supported the award of punitive damages because substantial evidence was introduced that plaintiff contacted defendant and
literally "importuned him" to cease his "meretricious flirtations"
with plaintiff's wife.

Wilson, 267 P.2d at 762.

Notwithstanding

plaintiff's repeated importunings, defendant not only continued his
relationship with plaintiff's wife, but also apparently increased
its intensity.

Under these circumstances, the jury awarded plain-

tiff punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.
On appeal, this Court declined to remit plaintiff's award of
compensatory damages.

In view of the substantial amount of com-

pensatory damages awarded, however, the Court did reduce the amount
of punitive damages from $25,000 to $5,000.
766.

Wilson, 267 P.2d at
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Based upon the authorities cited above, this Court should
vacate or remit the trial court's award of punitive damages for
three independent reasons.

First, there is no evidence in the

In

record to support the trial court's award of punitive damages.

an alienation action, an award of punitive damages may not be sustained on appeal in this State unless evidence of defendant's
financial worth has been introduced in the trial court.

In the

present case, there is no evidence in the record which indicates
defendant's financial worth.

Punitive damages, of course, "are

allowed as a punishment to the offender, and as a warning to him,
and to others, not to engage in similar vexatious actions."

Elking-

ton vs. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted).

~

award of punitive damages cannot properly serve the purpose of
punishing defendant unless some evidence is introduced regarding
defendant's financial worth.

If no such evidence is introduced,

the trial court risks either rendering defendant insolvent by
awarding an amount he cannot possibly pay, or failing to achieve
the underlying purpose of punitive damages by awarding an amount
which cannot truly punish defendant.

That such evidence was not

introduced in this case, is sufficient reason alone to vacate the
trial court's award of punitive damages.
The trial court's award of punitive damages is not
by the evidence for yet another reason.

support~

There was simply no

evidentiary showing in the trial court that defendant acted with
malice in alienating Brenda's affections.

First, the evidence

clearly indicates that Brenda initiated the relationship between
herself and defendant.

Second, Brenda's conduct was a natural

result of plaintiff's misconduct, including his alcoholism and
history of battering and abusing her.

Third, the evidence and it:

reasonable
inferences
clearly
indicate
that
defendant
was merely;
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\ 1

ictirn

o~

~ircu1~stances.

The evidence indicates that Brenda sought

the companionship, safety and affections of defendant.

Brenda's

conduct, of course, was motivated by plaintiff's abuses of her.
In

2ven if defendant intentionally capitalized on the unfortunate

us-

circumstances of plaintiff and Brenda's marriage, such conduct
alone would not justify a finding of malice.
Furthermore, as Wilson clearly indicates, evidence of defen-

s

dant's intentional or willful conduct does not alone constitute
malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.

Malice

m,

is defined as:

king-:

just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under

An

"[t]he intentional doing of a wrongful act without

circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent."
Law Dictionary 862, "Malice" (5th ed. 1979).

Black's

There is simply no

tg

evidence in the present case that defendant harbored an intent,

!,

born of ill will or evil disposition vis-a-vis plaintiff, to
alienate Brenda's affections.

In short, plaintiff failed to demon-

strate sufficient circumstances of aggravation, in addition to
defendant's alleged willfullness, to justify an award of punitive
damages.

the

1980).

See, Heist vs. Heist, 265 S.E.2d 434, 438 (N.C.App.
Plaintiff's failure to introduce sufficient evidence of

malice justifies this Court's total vacation of the trial court's

tea

award of punitive damages.
There is a second, independent reason which militates in favor

th

of substantially remitting the lower court's award of punitive
damages.

en

In Wilson, the award of punitive damages

bi

the jury was

remitted from $25,000 to $5,000 because the jury's award of compensatory damages was "very substantial."

Likewise, in the present

case, the lower court's award of compensatory damages was "very
substantial."

As noted above, moreover, the award was also exIf this Court, however,
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declines to reduce the lower court's award of compensatory

ddm~ge 3 ,

nevertheless, because of the very substantial amount of compensatory damages awarded by the trial court, this Court should measurably reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded.

Furthermore,

because the facts of the present case are a "far cry" from the
facts of Wilson, this Court should reduce the lower court's award
of punitive damages substantially below the amount of punitive
damages awarded in Wilson.
Finally, this Court should vacate the trial court's award of
punitive damages because the trial court's award appears to have
been motivated by improper considerations.

In Wilson, this Court

indicated its willingness to liberally review and modify exemplary
damage awards.

Specifically, this Court may modify an award of

punitive damages if it appears that such was the result of "passioo
and/or prejudice."

The trial court's post-trial s ta temen ts referred

to above, clearly indicate that the trial court was motivated by a /
desire to publicly punish defendant.

Although, under other circum-

stances, that desire may constitute a proper basis for awarding
reasonable punitive damages, nevertheless, in the present case,

I
t~

amount of punitive damages awarded by the trial court appears to
have been predicated upon passion and prejudice.
First, there was no evidence in the record below to support
the amount of compensatory damages actually awarded.

Secondly,

there was no evidence in the record to sustain plaintiff's burden
of proving that defendant acted out of malice.

Finally, the loWN

court stated, prior to its oral ruling on damages:

"I don't knM

how they're going to collect any money judgments that I give
against you but they're certainly going to get one against you a~
I hope this gets well publicized •

( T. 124)

It is doubtful
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I

in assess1n1 the a~ount ~f damages the court should award.
i,~;1ortantly,

More

hov1ever, the trial court's statement clearly indicates

that it was totally unaware, at the time it awarded plaintiff
punitive damages against defendant, of the status of defendant's
financial worth.

The trial court had no idea whether its award

-.1ould bankrupt defendant.

It is not a proper purpose of punitive

damages to bankrupt the defendant.

Under all the circumstances,

including the trial court's statements, it appears that the court's
award of punitive damages was based upon improper considerations
and was outside the bounds of the rule of reason.

For this reason,

the award should be vacated.
Because the trial court's ultimate determination of liability
was unsupported by substantial evidence, and because plaintiff
wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof, the cause must be
reversed.

Failing that, defendant respectfully urges this Court

to reduce the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded
j

e

I

by the trial court.

In the alternative, it should be reversed

and remanded for a new trial to allow the trial court to receive
sufficient evidence to facilitate the drafting of complete, competent findings of fact.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSTITUTED A MANIFEST ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.C.P.)
provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any.of the
parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes[:]
(1)
Irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury or adverse party, or any or~er of
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* * *
(3)
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
It is axiomatic that a motion for new trial under Rule 59 is
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial
court's determination with respect thereto will not be reviewed on
appeal except for an abuse of discretion.

See, e.g., Paul vs.

Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Uptown Appliance and.
Radio Co. vs. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952); Crellin vs.
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952).

The trial court, however,

may neither capriciously grant nor arbitrarily deny a motion for a
new trial.

Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952).

Justice in the American judicial system, in matters both
criminal and civil, is predicated upon a foundation of procedural
fairness.

The most important components of procedural fairness

notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.

a~

If fair

procedures are not employed in civil litigation, and as a result
justice fails, trial courts of this State have a duty to grant a
new trial:
Consistent with the purpose just discussed, whenever what has transpired in the proceeding i"SSO
offensive to the trial court's sense of justice
that he believes the desired objective of affording the parties a fair trial has failed, he has
both the prerogative and the duty to grant a new
trial. This court has always recognized that the
trial court has a broad discretion in doing so,
and that his ruling thereon should not be overturned unless it appears that his action was
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any
reasonable bounds of discretion.
Hyland vs. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738
(1967)

(emphasis added).

See also King vs. Union Pacific R. co.,

117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692 (1949).
In his motion for a new trial, defendant urged the lower cw
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to consider two aspects in which the proceedings employed by the

1

court and counsel in this case operated to deprive liim of proc·2dural fairness.

The lower court's failure to grant defendant a

new trial based upon either of these two independent grounds
i:herefor, constitute an abuse of discretion.

A.

Plaintiff's Failure To File Vii.th The c our t An d serve Upon

Defendant A Notice To Appoint Another Attorney Or To Appear In

n

Person Operated To Deprive The Trial Court Of Power To Proceed To

~,

1s.

:ver,

),

Trial And To Deprive Defendant Of Due Process Of Law.
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-36 (1977) provides as follows:
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended,
or ceases to act as such, a party to an action or
proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney
must before any further proceedings are had
against him be required by the adverse party, by
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to
appear in person.
(Emphasis added.)

aR 1

:air

This statute specifically provides that in the event a litigant' s attorney is removed from the case or suspended from the
practice of law, the opposing party, through counsel, must serve
upon the unrepresented party written notice to either appoint
ano.ther attorney or to enter his appearance pro se in the action.
This section, however, is silent with respect to the consequences
of the represented party's failure to serve this notice on the
unrepresented party.
Early case law interpreting the provisions of §78-51-36 adopted
a restrictive view of the requirement that an attorney must have
been "removed or suspended, or [ceased] to act as such."

138
),/

Van Cott vs. Wall,

53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (1919).

See,

Thus, the

notice requirement of §78-51-36 was interpreted by this Court as
binding only in those circumstances where the unrepresented party's
former attorney died, became totally disabled, or ceased practicing
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vs. Wall, 53 Utah 202, 178 P. 42, 45 (1919); Security Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. vs. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P.2d 214, 215 (1968).
This Court's most recent opinion with respect to §73-51-36,
however, clearly indicates that the notice requirement of that
section also applies in those instances in which the unrepresented
party's attorney merely withdraws from the litigation.
Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Utah 1977).

Utah Oil

In Utah Oil Co.,

plaintiff's attorney had withdrawn from the action some time after
an earlier pre-trial setting had been stricken.

One of the defen-

dants filed the notice required by §78-51-36.

Thereafter, no

further proceedings were had for over a year.

Eventually, defen-

dant moved the court for an involuntary dismissal based upon
plaintiff's failure to appoint substitute counsel or to appear in
the action pro se.

The lower court granted defendant's motion,

and plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, after citing the provisions of §78-51-36, this
Court made the following observations:
The foregoing clearly appears to have been enacted to safeguard a litigant who finds himself
without counsel and prevents further proceedings
until he again has counsel or chooses to proceed
pro se.
Id., at 1136 (emphasis added).
In short, when a litigant finds himself without counsel, for
whatever reason, including the withdrawal of his former counsel,
the opposing party must serve the notice required by §78-51-36 on
the unrepresented party.

Until such time as the unrepresented

party has counsel or chooses to proceed pro se, the court is wi~
power to conduct further proceedings.

This interpretation of §78·

51-36 is consistent with Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the
District and Circuit Courts:
When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record,
written notice of the withdrawal must be served
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upon the client of the ,1ithcJrawing attorney and
u~on all other parties not in default and a
C>'rtificate of service must be forthwith filed
with the court.
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws fron the case or ceases to
act as an attorney, the party ro an action for
whom such attorney was acting, must hefore any
furtt:er proceedings are had against him, be
required by the adverse party, by written
notice to appoint another attorney or to
appear in person.
(Emphasis added.)
A careful reading of these authorities yields the following
t~o

inescapable conclusions:

(1) the notice requirement of

§78-51-36 is binding in those situations in which the unrepresented
party's former counsel merely withdraws from the litigation; and,
(2) upon service of said notice upon the unrepresented party, the
court is powerless to proceed until the party upon whom the notice
was served has been afforded a reasonable time to either appoint
another attorney or to enter his appearance pro se.

What consti-

tutes a reasonable time is not in issue on this appeal, because it
is undisputed that plaintiff wholly failed to file the notice required by §78-51-36.

As noted above, however, that section does

not specify the consequences of a party's failure to file the
appropriate notice.
Utah Oil Co. clearly stands for the proposition that the
purpose of §78-51-36 is to "safeguard" a litigant who finds himself
without counsel.

The prophlactic purpose of §78-51-36 would be

entirely thwarted if the notice requirement thereof could be
ignored with impunity.

Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose

which this section was designed to achieve, this Court should hold
that a party who fails to comply with the requirements thereof may
not initiate nor benefit from any further proceedings in the
litigation
if Funding
the forunrepresented
party
would
unfairly
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prejudiced thereby.

Were the Court to adopt this position, defen-

dant would be entitled to reversal in this case because plaintiff initiated and benefited from further proceedings in this
litigation, and defendant was unfairly prejudiced thereby.
As the undisputed facts clearly disclose, defendant terminated
his former attorney sometime in late July or early August of 1980.
Thereafter, defendant's former attorney withdrew, but failed· to
send copies of his withdrawal to defendant as required by Rule 2.5
of the Rules of Practice.

Plaintiff failed to serve upon defendant

the notice required by §78-51-36 and Rule 2.5 of the Rules of
Practice.

No further proceedings were initiated by either party

for a period of four months.

On December 26, 1980, plaintiff

petitioned the lower court to set aside its earlier order of dismissal.

Within a period of less than 30 days, the action was

reinstated, trial was conducted, and a judgment in excess of
$84,000.00 was rendered in plaintiff's favor.
If the appropriate notice required by §78-51-36 had been
served upon defendant by plaintiff at the time of the withdrawal
of defendant's former counsel, defendant would have been

1

affo~~

four months to either retain new counsel or to prepare himself fm
trial.

If the appropriate notice had been filed on December 26,

1980, together with plaintiff's petition to reinstate, the

1

tri~

court would have been powerless, based upon the authority of
Utah Oil Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977), to

proceed~

hear plaintiff's petition on January 7, 1981 and conduct trial o:
this matter on January 21, 1981.

In short, if the required not~

had been filed on December 26, 1980, reinstatement on January
and trial on January 21 would have been precipitous because
defendant would not have been afforded a reasonable time to ap~
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The unfair

1

c·n· 1urllce to ck[enclunt in

tl1e present case of the failure of

1'1ai<tiff to fllf' the a,J;:n-opriat·2 w1tice, coupled with the precipitoa~ reinstatenent and trial of this matter,

is completely at odds

..:it'~ the purpose of §78-51-36 and Justifies reversal.

Moreover, plaintiff's failure to file the notice required by
§78-51-36 operated to deprive defendant of due process of law.
Due process of law in this State requires that the notice requirement of §78-51-36 be faithfully executed.

In Worrall vs. Ogden

City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980), plaintiff had been
terminated as a fireman for the City of Ogden because of his refusal to trim his handlebar mustache in accordance with "grooming
standards" of the Ogden City Fire Department.

The department chief

in his letter of termination to plaintiff, failed to inform plaintiff that he was entitled to appeal his termination within five
days to the Ogden City Civil Service Commission, as provided in
U.C.A. §10-3-1012 (Supp. 1977).

By the time plaintiff had contacted

and retained counsel to aide him in protecting his rights, the
five-day appeal time specified by statute had lapsed, and the Ogden
City Civil Service Commission refused to review his discharge on
the ground that the appeal was not timely filed.

Plaintiff subse-

quently filed suit, but the trial court ruled that plaintiff's
failure to file his appeal within the five-day limitaiton period
specified by statute conclusively terminated his right to any
further administrative or judicial review.

The lower court also

ruled that both the statute and the rules of the civil service
commission constituted adequate notice to plaintiff of the fiveday limitation.
On appeal to this Court, the plaintiff in Worrall contended
that the procedures employed by the department chief in terminating
him and Sponsored
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the provided
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right to appeal the termination within five days, constituted not
only a violation of the statute, but also operated to deprive plaintiff of due process cf law.

The Court agreed.

Worrall vs. Ogden

City Fire Dept., 616 P. 2d 598, 600-601 (Utah 1980).

The Court also

noted that the notice required by due process of law is that

noti~

which reasonably conveys the information required to inform the
person notified of the pendency of the proceedings, the nature
thereof, and of his right to appear and defend.

Id.

So fundamental is the importance of safeguarding the

interes~

of a temporarily unrepresented litigant that failure to do so by
serving upon him the notice required by §78-51-36, constitutes a
manifest denial of due process of law.

The advantage of insuring

that each party to civil litigation enjoys fundamental fairness
must be balanced against the disadvantage or inconvenience, if
any, to the opposing party of the procedures designed to guarantee
that fairness.

By its enactment of §78-51-36, the Utah Legislature

has determined that the requirement that opposing counsel serve
notice upon a temporarily unrepresented litigant to appoint a new ,
attorney or to appear pro se, is not unduly inconvenient.

In

short, the benefit not only to the unrepresented litigant, but

~

the system as a whole, substantially outweighs the inconvenience
accruing to the party required to serve the notice.

Because the

benefit itself is fundamental fairness and because fundamental
I

fairness is the very heart of due process of law, this Court shoulri ·
hold that a party's failure to serve the notice required by §78-Sl·ll
constitutes a denial of due process of law to the party upon wh~
the notice should have been served.
Such a holding would be consistent with Worrall.

The minor

inconvenience of including an additlonal sentence in a letter of
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l~; Qppeal right,

WQS held inconseyuential in Worrall, in view of

the nverwhel~inJ advant~Je of affording the terminated employee
notice of his right to appeal.
nothing less.

Fundamental fairness demanded

In the present case, the inconvenience of serving

the appropriate notice required by §78-51-36 on an unrepresented
litigant is insignificant.

The basic protection of that litigant's

rights afforded by such notice is overwhelming.

It is a denial of

due process, therefore, if such notice is not served as required
by statute.

The lower court's failure to grant defendant's motion

for a new trial on this ground alone, constituted an abuse of
discretion.
B.

Defendant Was Not Afforded Adequate And Timely Notice Of

Trial And As A Result, Was Denied An Opportunity To Be Heard In A
Meaningful Way.
The lower court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial
constituted an abuse of discretion for a second, independent reason:
defendant was not afforded timely notice of trial, as required by
due process.

The inevitable results of untimely notice, of course,

are the denial of an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way
and the erosion of fundamental fairness.
Due process of law is not a technical concept and cannot be
stated in terms of a rigid formula or mathematical equation; •[r]ather
the demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness
of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and
just to the parties involved."

Rupp vs. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d

338, 341 (Utah 1980).
The most essential elements of due process of law are timely
notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way.

See, Worrall'vs. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 601
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As a matter of due process, parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified. Consequently, notice is an
essential element of due process.
This is
especially true in proceedings of a judicial
nature affecting the property rights of citi
zens.
16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law §827 (1979) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
To satisfy the requirements of due process, notice must be
afforded which, under the particular circumstances of the case,
would allow the litigant to prepare for a meaningful opportunity
to be heard:
To meet the requirements of due process, the
notice must be reasonable and adequate for the
purpose, due regard being had to the nature
of the proceedings and the character of the
rights which may be affected by it.
The notice
which is an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.
In
other words, it must give sufficient notice of
the pendency of the action or proceeding and a
reasonable opportunity to a defendant to appear
and assert his rights before a tribunal legally
constituted to adJudicate such rights. The
notice must be of such a nature as reasonably
to convey the required information, and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance; but if, with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities
of a case, these conditions are reasonably met,
the constitutional requirements are satisfied.
16A Am.Jur. 2d 1017-1018 Constitutional Law §829 (1979)
omitted) (emphasis added).

(footnotes

See also, Worrall vs. Ogden City Fire

Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah 1980). 9
9
Not every deprivation of fundamental fairness, timely notic"
or a reasonable opportunity to be heard constitutes a violation
of due process. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
specifically provide that a liberty or property interest must be
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In the pr~scnt case, the trial court's findings of fact are
_1!,stantially inco1,1plete an;l unsupp0rt2d by the evidence with
cr:''P'"ct to the issue of adequate and timely notice.

For example,

th,: court did not find as fact the elate: upon •.1hich defendant received actual notice of the trial setting.

The record reveals

that plaintiff's petition for reinstatement was dated Friday,
December 26, 1980.

The petition was apparently mailed to the

court and was received and filed on Monday, December 29, 1980.
The lower court failed to find as fact the date upon which defendant received a copy of the petition, but the reasonable inference
is that defendant received a copy of the same on Monday, December

29, 1980.
A hearing on plaintiff's petition was conducted on January 7,

1981, less than ten days from the date defendant received a copy
of plaintiff's petition.

At the time of the hearing, the court

apparently granted plaintiff's petition to reinstate and specifically set the matter "for hearing."

There are three different

references in the record and transcript to the fact that the court
did not set the matter "for trial," but set the same "for hearing."
First, at the time plaintiff's petition was called up for hearing

constitute a violation of due process of law. As a matter of constitutional law, whenever a defendant in a civil action is in
jeopardy of being compelled to pay a civil judgment rendered in
plaintiff's favor, a property interest protected by due process
is sufficiently at stake to justify certain minimum procedural
protections.
Moreover, a defendant's liberty interest in privacy,
especially in the area of consensual sexual activities, is always
at stake in an alienation of affections action, and such interest
is entitled to due process protection. See, Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Finally, the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
is met in those circumstances where officers of the court, including
attorneys or clerks, or the machinery of the judicial process itself,
is called upon to enforce the rights of private litigants. Shelley
vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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and defendant was present in the courtroom, the court specifically
granted plaintiff's petition and set the matter for hearing.

It

is undisputed that defendant left the courtroom following the court',
granting of the petition.

Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel

of the court whether or not the matter had been set.

inquir~

The court re-

sponded again that the matter had been set for hearing.

Finally,

the clerk's minute entry also reveals that the court set the matter
"for hearing."

It is also significant that the court instructed

the clerk to contact defendant and inform him that the matter had
been set for hearing.
In its findings of fact, to which defendant strenuously objected
the court found that, on January 7, 1981, it set "the trial in the
instant matter for January 21, 1981."

R. 78, finding of fact 13.

There is no evidence in the record or transcript to indicate, however
that the court objectively manifested its intent to set the matter
for trial.

All of the objective manifestations of the court's

intent clearly indicated that the matter was set "for hearing."

It

is axiomatic, of course, that, although this Court gives great
deference to the findings of fact of the trial court, nevertheless,
the findings must be detailed and must be supported by substanti~
evidence. Hidden Meadows Development Co. vs. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, '
1250 (Utah 1979); Rucker vs. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-1339
(Utah 1979).

No evidence supports finding of fact #3.

All the

evidence clearly indicates that the court set the matter not for
trial, but for hearing.

Although an attorney may have interpret~

the court's determination to set the matter "for hearing" as, in
fact, a trial setting, defendant was not an attorney.

As a laymar.,

defendant did not understand, as of January 7, 1921, that the
hearing
to which the court referred was a trial on the merits.
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1t~e onl: 1 c:vic1Pncr"

in the~ ti:ansci:ipt oi: record \lhich indicates the

cla te uron 1·it, ich defendant received actual notice of trial setting,
clParly ciemonstrates

t~at

defendant first became aware of the trial

settina en January 19, 1981, bai:ely two days before trial.
As noted above, the lower court instructed the clerk to inform
defendant that the matter had been set for hearing.

The lower

court found as fact that the trial court executive did, in fact,
telephone defendant.

R. 79, finding of fact #8.

to findina of fact

because it was incomplete and misleading.

~ost

~8

Defendant objected

importantly, this finding failed to indicate the date upon

which that telephone conversation was conducted.

The only evidence

before the trial court on defendant's motion for a new trial was
that the telephone conversation in fact took place on January 19,

1981, after defendant first received notice of trial setting.
R.

52, 84.

Thus, although the trial court's findings are incomplete and
misleading on this issue, nevertheless, the only evidence presented thereon was that defendant received actual notice of trial
for the first time on January 19, 1981.

That date is the date

upon which he received the court's notice of trial setting and the
date upon which the telephone conversation was conducted between
the trial court executive and defendant.
The ti:ial court also found that defendant made no objection
to the January 21, 1981 trial setting.

R. 79, finding of fact #6.

Moreover, the court found as fact that defendant did not request
a continuance and did not inform the court that he was unprepared
to proceed at the time of trial.

The record does not indicate that

defendant was advised by anvone--the court, the trial executive,
the clerk, or plaintiff's counsel--that he had a right to object to
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continuance.

---

Defendant is an unsophisticated layman and was not

versed in the nuances of civil procedure.

Moreover, defendant

r~

ceived actual notice of trial setting only two days before the
trial was scheduled to commence.

Unc'1er all the circumstances, it

would have been totally uDreasonable to have expected defendant

~

object when he did not understand his right to do so or to move the
court for a continuance when he did not understand how to do so,
especially where trial was but two days away from the date he
received notice thereof.
The lower court also found as fact that the court "cautioned
the defendant at the commencement of the trial, but defendant
indicated his readiness to proceed without counsel."
ing of fact #13.

R. 79, find-

There is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript

that the court cautioned defendant, at any point during the entiu
proceedings, about the hazards of proceeding without counsel.

Tu

the contrary, as the transcript clearly indicates, the court's

c~

versation with defendant at the commencement of trial was abbrevi·
ated and terse.

In fact, the court interrupted defendant twice in

I

the middle of a sentence and ordered the parties to proceed with
their cases.

See Tr. 5-6.

to finding of fact #13.

Finding of fact #17 is closely related

In the former finding, the court purport~

1

to find that additional notice to defendant to obtain counsel would'
have served no useful purpose because defendant made his

decisi~

to represent himself "notwithstanding cautions from the trial c~
executive and from the court itself."

R. 80.

As previously noteci,

however, the court simply did not caution defendant concerning
self-representation.

Moreover, defendant in his post-trial affi·

davit indicated that the trial court executive did not caution
defendant about the hazards of proceeding without counsel.
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R. 8,~,

indi~~

t~2t

-

she cautioned
finally,

he was

defen~ant

conc0rnino self-representation.

R. 64.

the trial court fot'nc as fact that clefem1ant indicated

prepared and ready to rroceed at trial without counsel.

The

record indicates that defendant did, in fact, advise the court that

o

he was prepared to proceed.

he

Defendant's statements, however,

should not be inflexibly or riqidly construed.

First, it is a

matter of common knowledge to members of the bench and bar of this
State that the modern complexities of the judicial system virtually
incapacitate the untrained and unskilled from proceeding to act as
their own counsel in complex civil litiqation.

No layman possesses

the knowledge or ability to represent himself in a civil trial.

d-

With this realization in mind, the federal courts have adopted a

ipt

general policy designed to liberally protect the rights of pro se

re

litigants.

'o

1977)

on·

e.~.,

Hemphill vs. Melton, 551 F.2d 589 (4th Cir.

(complaints of pro se plaintiffs more broadly and liberally

interpreted); Finley vs. Staton, 542 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1976)

i·
in

See,

(complaints of pro se plaintiffs liberally interpreted and conI

strued); Holmes vs. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1980)

(pro~

plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to "fairly and freely"
.ed

amend his complaint).
Second, defendant's statement that he was prepared to proceed
should be interpreted in the context of the length of the time he
had to prepare.

Defendant received actual notice of trial on

January 19, 1981.

Because he had not been advised of his right to

object to that setting or his riqht to move for a continuance,
defendant believed he had no choice but to prepare for trial.

Few

attorneys, if any, could have prepared this kind of case for trial
in two days.

Many attorneys could not have prepared defendant's

case in
theby thetwo
weeks
from
January
7, by
1981,
date
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,,,
~

"setting," to January 21, 1981, the date of trial.

Nevertheless,

under the compulsion of the circumstances, defendant "prepared"
his case to the best of his ability.

Thus, defendant's statement

at the commencement of trial thct he was "prepared," must be

inte~

preted to mean that, given the fact he was afforded only two days
notice and that he was an unsophisticated layman, he had done the
best he could to ready himself for trial.
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates that defendant was
denied due process of law because he was not afforded timely and
adequate notice of trial.

Notice was untimely because defendant

was given but two days to prepare for trial.

If defendant is

deemed to have had notice of trial on January 7, 1981, then the
notice was inadequate because defendant was only informed that he
was to prepare for a "hearing."

That the trial court proceeded in

such an unduly expeditious fashion to grant plaintiff's petition
for reinstatement, set the trial, and conduct the same within a
period of two weeks, only compounded the denial of defendant's
right to procedural fairness.

That the lower court failed to

inform defendant of his right to object or his right to a

contin~

ance, constituted the final erosion of defendant's due process of
law rights.

Moreover, this Court should adopt the position espousei

by the federal courts that even in civil litigation, the trial
court has some minimum responsibility to protect the due process
rights of a pro se litigant, especially where, as here, a litigant's
pro se status is coerced by what may be misconduct on the part of
his former attorney and by the failure of the opposing party to
provide the minimum notice required by §78-51-36.

For these reasons

the cause should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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COI!CLliSICI!
For the reasons stated in Point I above, this Court should
,olish actions for alienation of affections in this jurisdiction.
In the alternative, the Court should reverse the trial court because plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof.

Further,

in the alternative, the Court should reverse the cause and remand
for a new trial because defendant was denied due process of law and
because plaintiff failed to file and serve upon defendant the
notice required by due rrocess and by n.C.A. §7£-51-36 (1953) and
Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah.

Only as a last resort should the

Court reverse the cause and remand for a new trial to allow the
lower court to receive sufficient evidence to facilitate the
drafting of more complete, consistent and supportable findings of
fact.

As an additional alternative, this Court should reduce the

amounts awarded as compensatory and punitive damages to conform
11ith the law and the evidence.
DATED this

j]tC.._ day of July' 1981.

CHAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOl•:AHD, LEIHS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mniled two (2) true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mr.
K. L. Mc!ff, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 151 North
Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, postage prepaid, this~
day of July, 1981.
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K. L. MCIFF
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone:
896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,

FINDINGS ANO JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,

Civil No. 7928

Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial
this 21st day of January, A.O. 1981, and the parties being

\

present and having stated their readiness to proceed, and the
Court having heard the evidence adduced and being fully
advised in the premises,

NOW FINDS AND ORDERS as follows, to-wit:
FINDINGS
1.

t t all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was

the husband of one Brenda Nelson, now Brenda Jacobson, having
\,

married her on or about July 15, 1978.
2.

That the Defendant did wrongfully interfer

with the said marriage and did willfully, intentionally and
maliciously alienate the affection of Brenda Nelson for her
husband, Brett Nelson.
3.

That over a course of several months, Defendant

had numerous and sundry contacts and rendezvous with the
Plaintiff's wife without the knowledge of Plaintiff, and
while Plaintiff was at work.
4.

That the Oe~endant had sexual ~elations with

Plaintiff's wife on at least ~ix· occasions while Plainti'ff's
marriage was still in force.

123

JUDGt-/'.:i,r;· L:·lTrnf:D
JJUDGt,-~;~:H C~'Cl~:T

JV
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That the marriage relationship is ~acred and

the contracting parties thereto are entitled to all of the
benefits of such contract and such relationship free from the

willful interference by other persons.
6.

That each spouse in a marital relationship is

entitled to the benefits of consortium, including not only
the material services, but love, felicity, companionship, the
exchange of ideas, and the maintenance of an intimacy abounding

in reciprocal acts of kindness.

7.

That Defendant's willful interference in

Plaintiff's marriage caused Plaintiff to loose the benefits
to be derived from marriage as heretofore set forth, and has

further caused Plaintiff significant mental anquish, distress
and suffering.
8.

That in due course, Plaintiff's marriage

terminated, and that the tortious interference by Defendant
was fully consumated by Defendant's marriage to Plaintiff's
former wife, Brenda Nelson.

9.

That Plaintiff has established a sound basis

for the award of damages for loss of consortium both past and
future, mental anguish both past and future, and punitive
damages.
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant
as follows:
1.

For loss of consortium, the sum of $600.00 per

month for a period of sixteen months beginning in June of
1979, for a total of $9,600.00.
2.

For future loss of consortium and for mental

.<A

anguish, the sum of~lf,000.00.

I)~

/.fa/ ..._,'..I
......

l •

~,000.00.

3.

For punitive damages, the sum of

4.

The total judgment of $84,6000.00 shall bear

interest at the rate of eight (8%) percent per annum from and
after the date hereof until fully satisfied.
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in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with firstclass postage thereon fully prepaid on the

~ day of

January, 1981, addressed as follows:
Mr. Jeff Jacobson
1425 South State
Salina, Utah
84654
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IN TiiE DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

Plaintiff
NO.

-- ----- --

STATE OF UTAH

21,,,ir

CERTIFICATE

Defendant
STATE OF UTAH
Co.mty of Sanpete

SS,

I, the undersigned Clerk of the District Court of the Ccunty cf San~e~.
State c:f Utah do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the
judgment rendered in the a~ve entitled acticn 1

r

.5-/ .:z

and recorded in Judgment Record
of aaid ccurt, at page/..(
fl-/,(~
AND I further certify that the for~going papers hereto annexed cr:ns-.g-;;;_;-~ Judgment P.c>ll in said action.

C>.:;_,_L

WITNESS my hand and seal of said court hereto set en +,.h:.s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

day of

l\~kµi:l-!'--1:J
"

/"
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K. L. McIFF
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone:
896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

Civil No. 7928

THIS MATTER having come before the Court this 4th
day of March, A.D. 1981 on the Plaintiff's motion for a new
trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
counsel having submitted their briefs in support of their
respective positions, together with supporting affidavits and
transcripts, and having appeared and argued the matter, and
the Court being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law, to-wit:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On January 7, 1981 the instant matter came

before the Court on the Plaintiff's petition for reinstatement
and for trial setting.
2.

January 7, 1981 was the Court's term opening,

at which time it sets trials in all matters which are at
issue before the Court.

3.

That Defendant was present in person at the

.

....... nA~~" . .1-h

term opening on January 7, 1981 at which time the

(A~f'

Court~et

the trial in the instant matter for January 21, 1981.
4.

That on January 14, 1981, the Court signed a

written order reinstating the instant action and setting it
for trial on January 21, 1981.
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5.

That the written order of reinstatement and

trial setting was mailed to Defendant on January 15, 1981.

6.

That the instant matter had been ~~nding for

well over a year's time, and had been before the Court at

each of its terms openings, as well as other occassions, and
had been set for trial and continued on prior occassions, and
no objection was made by the Defendant to the trial setting

for January 21, 1981.
7.

That in addition to the formal order signed by

the Court, notice of the trial setting was sent to the Defen-

dant by the Clerk of the Court.
8.

In addition, the trial court's executive

telephoned the Defendant advising him of the trial setting
and advising him that he should retain counsel, that Plaintiff
was represented by competent counsel, and that Defendant

should employ counsel.
9.

That in the said telephone conversation between

Defendant and the trial court executive, the Defendant advised

the trial court executive that he had determined to represent
himself at the upcoming trial.
10.

That Defendant had originally been represented

by one David Brown, Attorney at Law, of Salt Lake City, Utah,
and that between the January 7, 1981 date and January 21,
1981 when the trial was held, Defendant contacted another
attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he reviewed everything.
ll.

That at no time did the Defendant appear

before the Court and request a continuance or advise the
Court that he was not prepared to proceed.
12.

That Defendant appeared before the Court at

the time and place set for trial and advised the Court that
he was prepared to represent himself.
13.

That the court cautioned the Defendant at the

commencement of the trial, but Defendant indicated his readiness to proceed without counsel.
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That Defendant came to the trial with his

witnesses, that he called and examined the same, crossexamined Plaintiff's witnesses, and argued his case.
15.

That subsequent to the trial, and in the form

of affidavits, Defendant has alleged certain facts relating
to his relationship with his former attorney David P. Brown,
which facts were not known to the Court before the trial, and
Defendant should pursue such remedy in relation thereto as he
deems appropriate.
16.

That Defendant was aware that his relationship

with his original attorney had been terminated, that the
matter was going forward, and that he was either obliged to
obtain other counsel or represent himself, and he made a
conscious decision to do the latter.
17.

That an additional notice from Plaintiff to

Defendant to obtain counsel would have served no useful
purpose, Defendant having made his decision to represent
himself notwithstanding cautions from the trial court executive
and from the Court itself.
18.

That the trial setting, as well as proceeding

with the trial, was consistent with the orderly handling of
the Court's trial calendar, and the Court was unaware of any
reason that i t should not proceed with trial.
19.

That it would be unjust to impose on Plaintiff

the necessity of a new trial for a problem which Defendant
claims arose between him and his attorney, and which was not
made known to Plaintiff or to the court until after the
trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Trial on the matter was set consistent with

the Court's usual practices and consistent with procedural
fairness and due process.
2.

The Defendant received timely notice of the

trial and was given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way.
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The Defendant has a right to represent himself.

4.

Under the facts as heretofore found, there is

no legal basis for Defendant's claim that he was denied
procedural fairness or due process of law.

5.

The burden of a problem belatedly alleged to

exist between Defendant and his former counsel should not

rest upon Plaintiff.
6.

Otah recognizes a cause of action for alienation

of affection, including an award for loss of consortium, the
law being properly stated in Wilson vs, Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d
362, 267 P2d 759 (1954), and being distinguishable from
rulings in Black vs. United States, 263 F.Supp. 470 (D. Utah
1967) and Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 P2d 438 (Utah 1979); the
latter dealing with negligence claims.
It is the Court's opinion that the basic premise on

which one marital partner is precluded from a separate recovery
for loss of consortium where the other marital partner suffers
from a negligent injury is that such damages are included in

the direct recovery of the injured marital partner.

That is

to say that whatever is denied to the one is included in the
recovery of the other.

such reasoning is wholly inapplicable

to alienation of affection cases; there being no recovery for
the marital party whose affections have been alienated, and
the end product of the alienation being divorce.

The injured

party has no remedy except direct action against the intentional tort-feasor.
It is further the Court's opinion that the right of
privacy, including privacy relating to sexual matters, as
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) do not extend
to confer on one man the right to become sexually involved
with the wife of another man free from any concern or interference by the state.
The court is of the opinion that the marriage
covenant and contract should be afforded the protection of
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-sthe l~w and that the rights of the respective marital partners
therein are paramount and take precedent over an interloper's
right of privacy in sexual matters which threaten the integrity
of that marriage covenant and contract.

7.

Defendant has failed to establish a sound

basis for the granting of a new trial.
8.

The Defendant has failed to establish a sound

basis for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
9.

With respect to the findings and judgment

heretofore entered, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 are properly

findings of fact and are hereby designated as such; findings
5, 6, and 9 are conclusions of law and are hereby designated

as such.
is reaffirmed.

AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT was placed in
the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class
postage thereon fully prepaid on the

day of March,

1981, addressed as follows:
Mr. Craig M. Snyder
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
Provo, Utah
84601
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CRAIG M, SNYDER, for:
HOWARD. LEWJS ell PETERSEN
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3

4
5

Altoru.,.. for.~D:::e:.;f::e=:n'.!Cd=a!.!n.::t_ _ _ _ _ __

6

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9

BRETT W. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

~o

11
12

vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,

OBJECTIONS TO ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Civil No. 7928

Defendant.

13
14

COMES NOW Jeff Jacobsen, through his attorney, Craig M. Snyder

15

and submits the following objections to the Court's Order Denying

16

Motion for New Trial and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

17

l.

The Court's Finding of Fact t3 states that defendant was

18

present in person on January 7, 1981 "at which time the Court set

19

the trial in the instant matter for January 21, 1981."

20

did not, in fact, •set the trial" in this matter on January 7,

21

1981.

22

discloses that the Court did not in open court set the matter for

23

trial, but rather scheduled it.•for hearing on January 21, 1981,

The Court

The transcript of the January 7, 1981 "setting" clearly

24

at 10:00 a.m., following the Law and Motion matters."

25

davit of defendant clearly indicates that on January 7, 1981,

The affi-

26

after the Court set this case "for hearing,• defendant immediately

27

left the courtroom.

The subsequent interchange between the Court

28

and Hr. Mciff, some 20 minutes after the Court set the matter "for

29

hearing,• was conducted outside the presence of defendant.

30

even if the Court had clarified that the "hearing" it had referred

Thus,

31

to in its earlier Order from the bench meant a full-blown trial,

32

defendant was not present during such interchange and,

therefore,
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1

could not have understood that by "hearing" the Court meant a full-

2

blown trial.

Even the subsequent interchange between the Court and

3

Mr. Mciff, however, fails to specifically indicate that the Court

4

was setting the matter, not for hearing, but for trial.

5

Therefore, defendant objects to Finding of Fact #3 upon the

6

ground that the Court did not, on January 7, 1981, set this case

7

nfor trial.•

8

9

Defendant objects to Finding of Fact 15 upon the ground

2.

that said finding is irrelevant and misleading.

That finding

~O

states that a written order of reinstatement and trial setting

11

•was mailed to defendant on January 15, 1981."

The uncontradicted

12

affidavit of defendant, presented to the Court at the time of the

13

March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's post-trial motions, clearly

14

indicates that defendant received the Court's order of reinstate-

15

ment and trial setting on January 19, 1981.

16

the trial setting was mailed is completely irrelevant and mislead-

17

ing on the issue of timely notice of trial setting.

18

in the previous objection, defendant believed that the case had

The date upon which

As indicated

19

been set "for hearing• when he left the courtroom on January 7,

20

1981.

21

Court referred on January 7, 1981, was in fact a full-blown trial.

Defendant had no notice that the "hearing• to which the

22

Defendant first received notice of the trial setting on January 19,

23

1981.

24

1981, is wholly irrelevant and misleading because the key issue is

25

not when the notice was mailed, but when defendant received actual

26

notice of trial setting.

27

not receive actual notice until January 19, 1981, two days before

28

trial.

29
30

That the notice of trial setting was mailed on January 15,

3.

As indicated previously, defendant did

Defendant objects to the Court's Finding of Fact 17 on

the ground that said finding is incomplete and substantially mis-

31

leading.

32

was sent to the defendant by the Clerk of the Court.•

That finding provides that •notice of the trial setting
The finding

.--,
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l

does not indicate the date upon which the notice therein referred

2

to was received by defendant.

3

defendant's post-trial motions was whether or not defendant had

The issue presented to the Court in

4

received actual notice of trial in a timely manner.

5

Fact t7 does not specifically address the issue of when defendant

Finding of

6

received actual notice of trial.

7

on defendant's post-trial motions clearly indicated that said

8

notice was sent first to David Brown, defendant's former counsel.

9
~O

Moreover, evidence at the hearing

Finally, as indicated above, defendant's uncontradicted affidavit
clearly indicates that he did not receive the notice of trial

11 setting referred to in Finding of Fact t7 until January 19, 1981.
12

The fact that notice was sent and the fact that it was mailed on

13

January 15, 1981 are wholly irrevelant with respect to the issues

14 of when defendant received actual notice and whether or not such
15
16
17

actual notice was timely.
4.

Defendant objects to the Court's Finding of Fact tB.

Said

finding indicates that the trial court executive telephoned defen-

18 dant advising him of the trial setting and advising him that he
19

should retain counsel.

20

not indicate the date upon which said telephone conversation was

The finding is incomplete because it does

21

conducted.

22

affidavit indicates, it was defendant who contacted the trial court

More importantly, however, as defendant's attached

23

executive by telephone, not vice versa.

24

having received the notice of trial setting ref erred to above and

25

for the first time having realized that a trial, not a hearing, was

In fact, defendant, after

26 scheduled for January 21, 1981, contacted the trial court executive
27

to confirm that he (defendant) was expected to proceed with a full-

28

blown trial on January 21, 1981.

29

conducted on January 19, 1981, two,days before trial.

Said telephone canversation was

30

5. Defendant objects toe the Court's Finding of Fact 110 on
31 the ground that said finding is erroneous and unsubstantiated by

32 any evidence presented

a~ the March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's
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post-trial motions.

Said finding states that •between the January

2

7, 1981 date and January 21, 1981 when the trial was held, defen-

3

dant contacted another attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he

4

reviewed everything."

The attached affidavit of defendant clearly

5

indicates that the conversation between defendant and R. Don Brown,

6

referred to in Finding of Fact flO, did not take place between

7

January 7, 1981 and January 21, 1981.

8

place substantially before January 7, 1981, was informal, and in

9

no event constituted a complete review of •everything,• as expli-

~O

citedly stated in said finding.

Said conversation took

In fact, as defendant's affidavit

11 clearly indicates, defendant did not even have a copy of his file
12 at the time of his conversation with R. Don Brown.
13

Of course,

therefore, defendant and R. Don Brown could not have discussed in

14 any detail the procedural or substantive aspects of the case.
15 Therefore, the finding as prepared is wholly unsubstantiated and
16
17

completely erroneous.
6.

Defendant objects to the Court's Findings of Fact tll, 112

18 and #13 on the grounds that they are unsubstantiated misleading.
19

Finding of Fact ill provides that defendant did not appear before

20

the Court and request a _continuance or advise the Court that he was

21

not prepared to proceed.

Said finding is misleading for two reason

22

First, the uncontradicted evidence indicates that defendant is not

23

and was not, at all times relevant to this proceeding, versed in

24

civil procedure.

25

right to a continuance or a right to advise the Court that he was

In short, defendant had no idea that he had a

26

not prepared to proceed.

27

because it implies that defendant understood civil procedure to the

28

extent that he waived a known right by failing to request-a continu

29

ance or to inform the Court that he was unprepared to proceed.

30

Thus, Finding of Fact tll is misleading

Second, Finding of Fact tll is misleading because it fails to

31

disclose that defendant had a substantial reason for not advising

32

the court he was unprepared to proceed.

-4-

Defendant knew that the

-f'I
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2

Court was to hear the evidence and felt that if he were to advise

the Court he was unprepared to proceed, such admission of unpre-

3

paration might seriously prejudice his case on the merits.

4

of his unfamiliarity with procedure, therefore, defendant considere

5

it ill-advised to inform the Court that he was unprepared.

6
7

e
9
~O

Because

Defendant objects to Finding of Fact tl2 for the same reasons
cited as objections to Finding tll above.
With respect to Finding of Fact 113, defendant objects on the
ground that the transcript of trial indicates that the Court did
not caution the defendant about proceeding EE:?_ se.

The transcript

ll

indicates that the Court asked the defendant whether or not he was

12

represented, advised the defendant that it would hear the evidence

13

and make appropriate rulings based thereon, and advised defendant
that he had a right to represent himself.

But at no point prior

to the trial did the Court caution defendant about the hazards of
proceeding EE:?_

~·

Therefore, Finding of Fact 113 is not supported

by any evidence whatsoever.
7.

Defendant objects to Finding of Fact 115 on the ground

that said finding is wholly irrelevant and unnecessary to dispose

20
21
22

of the issues prosecuted at the March 4, 1981 hearing.
8.

Defendant ohjects to Findings of Fact tl6 and tl7 upon

the grounds that they are unsubstantiated and make no reference to

23

Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit

24

Courts of the State of Utah and Utah Code Annotated S78-51-36

25

(1953).

26

matter was going forward" and "that he [defendant] was either

Finding of Fact tl6 states that defendant knew "the

27

obliged to obtain other counsel or represent himself, and he made

28

a conscious decision to do the latter."

29

that additional notice from plaintiff to defendant to obtain coun-

.30

sel "would have served no useful purpose• because defendant chose

.31

to proceed EE:?_ ~· "notwithstanding cautions from the trial court

.32

executive and from the Court itself.•

-s-

Finding of Fact tl7 states

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.-:- 'fo

l

2
3

These findings are unsubstantiated and misleading for three
reasons.
First, as noted above, there was no evidence to indicate that

4

either the trial court executive or the Court itself •cautioned"

5

defendant about proceeding without counsel.

To the contrary,

6

neither the Court nor the trial court executive warned defendant

7

of the hazards of proceeding without counsel or in any other manner

8

•cautioned" him.

9
~O

Second, no evidence was presented at the March 4, 1981 hearing
to substantiate the finding that further notice •would have served

11

no useful purpose.•

12

cated that, as of January 7, 1981, defendant believed he was to

To the contrary, the evidence clearly indi-

13

prepare for a "hearing,• and defendant received no formal notice

14

of a full-blown trial until January 19, 1981.

15

afforded the requisite notice to appoint counsel, as provided by

Had defendant been

16

Utah law, at the most logical point in the proceedings, i.e.

17

December 26, 1980 (the date upon which plaintiff petitioned the

18

Court to set aside its earlier order of dismissal), although

19

defendant would have been afforded less than a month to prepare

20

for trial, nevertheless, he would have had at least three additiona

21

weeks to prepare his presentation.

22

Third, Findings tl6 and tl7 wholly ignore defendant's primary

23

argument in support of his motion for a new trial, namely, that

24

plaintiff's failure to comply with U.C.A. S78-51-36 and Rule 2.5

25

of the Rules of Practice was prejudicial and operated to deny

26

defendant his constitutional, due process rights.

27

appeal, a finding should be made that plaintiff failed to comply

28

with Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice and S78-Sl-36 and that the

29

court determines that such failure was not in the least prejudicial

30

Plaintiff's failures to comply with the state statute and court

31

rule are virtually beyond dispute.

32

implied finding, however, that such failures were not prejudicial,

For purposes of

Defendant objects to the Court'
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l

on the grounds that said implied finding is unsubstantiated.

2

Therefore, defendant .obj,ects to Findings U6 and il 7 accordingly,

3

9.

Defendant objects to Finding of Fact tl9 on the ground

4

that said finding is unsupported by the evidence.

5

dence was presented at the March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's

First, no evi-

6

post-trial motions to support the proposition that plaintiff would

7

be prejudiced were the Court to grant defendant a new trial in

B

this matter.

9

without force in view of plaintiff's own failure to comply with

Second, plaintiff's argument of prejudice is wholly

~O

§78-51-36 and Rule 2.5.

ll

hands" and had properly discharged his burden under state law, as

12

provided in §78-51-36, plaintiff might then have a more persuasive

13

argument that he would be prejudiced if defendant were granted a

14

new trial.

15

failed to comply with state law, has •unclean hands," and there-

16

fore, is in no position to argue prejudice when, in fact, plaintiff s

17

failure to notify defendant to appoint counsel significantly pre-

18

judiced defendant at the original trial of this matter.

19

of Fact tl9, therefore, is objectionable.

20

In other words, if plaintiff had "clean

In the present case, however, plaintiff refused and

Finding

For the reasons stated above, defendant objects to the Court's

21

findings.

22

and redraft its findings in accordance with the evidence and with

23

the analysis presented herein.

24

Defendant respectfully urges the Court to reconsider

Respectfully submitted this

-Zr./K..da~

of March, 1981.

25
26
27

28

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant

29
30
31
32

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing Objections to Mr. K. L. Mciff, Attorney

-7-
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for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701,

2

postage prepaid, this ~day of March, 1981.
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I
K. L. McIFF
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone:
896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS
OF FACT

vs.
JEFF JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 7928

The Court having considered the objections of the

t

t·

Defendant to the findings made by the Court in its Order

i.

Denying Motion for a New Trial and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and having further considered the
Plaintiff's response thereto, now orders as follows, to-wit:
Finding of Fact Number 10 on page 2 is amended to
read as follows:
10.

That Defendant had originally been represented

by one David Brown, Attorney at Law," of Salt Lake City, Utah,
and that subsequent to the termination of that employment and
prior to the trial on the merits, Defendant contacted another
attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he reviewed everything, and following which Defendant made a decision to

f 1:::<··~~{__}~~~~\

i:_e~se~~V>imself in the
1

this

action.

_.l::;;t......-'"""l'-=~1

'·

~~

··,~ --

'·

~·

•,: -, ,'

;·f{
·,/ /t;f'

\?{~\a~1~i=~~~!by

c::::::v:a:F a

~:::~G

true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS OF FACT was
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120 East 300 North
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1

JACKSON HOWARD, for:

HOV'/ARD. LEWIS 6 PETERSEN

"°'"'"

ATJ"ORNEY8 AND C:OUNSELOR8 AT LAW

120 EAn 300

SrMrr
P'. o. aoz 778
P'ROVO. UTAH 84.ol

2

~· 37>--&S411

3
4

5

Attorney> forc..-.:De=fo.:e:..:n.:;d:.;a:.;n=t______

6

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9

BRETT W. NELSON,

11
12

vs.
Civil No. 7928

JEFF JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

13
14

STATE OF UTAH

15

COUNTY OF UTAH

16
17

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,

10

- - - - - - - - -

:ss.

I, JEFF JACOBSEN, after being first duly sworn, depose and
say:

18

1.

19

2.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled action.
am a person with limited education.

I have had no

20

prior business experience and I am not acquainted with lawyers

21

or how they charge.

22

in a legal action before this case.

23

3.

I have never been a plaintiff or a defendant

When I was served with the Complaint in this matter, I

24

asked a friend what to do and he recommended to me Mr. David P.

25

Brown, an attorney in Salt Lake City.

26

Mr. Brown to represent me and at that time I paid to Mr. Brown a

I subsequently contacted

27

retainer of $500.

28

a copy of the check covering that ret.ainer.

29

4.

30

quested that

There is attached hereto and made a part hereof

After I had retained Mr. Brown to represent me, he rebring in an additional $6,500, which he would hold

31

in his trust fund.

32

settlement with Mr. Nelson's attorney, pay any additional attor-

He would use that trust fund to negotiate a
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l

ney's fees that were incurred, and refund the balance to me.

2

3

5.

In approximately August or September of 1980, Mr. Brown

notified me that he had been able to negotiate a settlement of

4

this case for the amount of $5,000, and he requested that I send

5

$5,000 to his office to cover the amount of the settlement.

6

asked him why he just did not take the $5,000 out of the $7,000

7

that was being held in the trust account and he replied that

8

charges for his legal services had used up the entire amount of

9

I

the $7,000 and that I would have to send more money in order for

~o

him to be able to try the case.

When

ll

that if

12

$1,300 out of the money in the trust account to me and that

I

protested, he stated

would write a letter discharging him, he would refund

I

13

could approach the plaintiff directly and attempt to settle the

"'<
m"

14

case by giving him a promissory note for $5,000 or negotiating

t"·
.. 0 •"

15

my own settlement •

z~

.5

ffi ~

'

16

\
Since I did not have an additional $5,000 to provide Mr.

II.I 0 .i 0

l?

Brown, Mr. Brown indicated that he would not represent me without

Cm•

18

receiving additional attorney's fees to cover the costs of trial.

oo
:c~

19

., 5! ~ ~

~~!~
u
0

.

~~Si
0:

>

0

<"•
3:
~ ...

6.

~

told Mr. Brown that I would send him the letter dis-

20

charging him and asked him to send me copies of all of the corres-

21

pondence and pleadings and his notes which were contained in my
also requested that he send me copies of my deposition

22

file.

23

and the deposition of the plaintiff, Brett W. Nelson, which

24

were taken in the case.

25

deliver any portion of his file, nor did he give me any instruc-

26

tions concerning what might occur if he were to withdraw as coun-

27

sel.
7.

28

Mr. Brown sent me the $1,300 but did not

on January 19, 1981, I received a letter in the mail

29

from the Clerk of the Court saying that the case was to be tried

30

on January 21, 1981.

31

and incapable of representing myself.

32

not have counsel and there is attached hereto a copy of the judg-

I appeared at the trial, but was unprepared
The case was tried, I did

ment.
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8.

l.

I received no notice from Mr. K. L. Mclff notifying me

2

to obtain new counsel prior to the trial date and no copy of Mr.

3

Brown's notice of withdrawal was sent to me.

DATED this

4

2i'fc_

day of January, 1981.

5
6
7

e
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1:J:i1_day of January,

9
~o

1981.

l.l

12

NOT{lc;;lr,I'f0 •
Residing at:

13
z~

.,wj
~;
.. g
~

..., ,:

14
15

z

16

~8

17

;i
oo

19

.J~

.•
".
a:>

z5

~~~
.

My Commission Expires:

sh/~1

18
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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l

MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. K. L. Mclff, Attorney

2

for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah

3

6th day of February, 1981.

84701, this

4
5
6

71
8
9
:)..0

ll
12

z

a:
""'
"'.ti

..

§"'

"'

.J

13
14
15

17

ci
a:

18

~

·19

<

0

:c

\

16
\

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-S"'I -

A P P E N D I X

F

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:

1

HOW'ARD. L.EWIS 6 PETERSEN

AT'TOR.NIEYS A.ND COUN911.0RS AT LAW
12.0 EAST $00 NORTM SnacrT
,., O. BOX TT8
P'ROYO. UTAH M901
Tl:LD'NONSI STS-8~

2

3
4
5

AllDmeyo for

Defendant

6

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9

BRETT W. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

~o

11
12

vs.

15

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

:ss.
COUNTY OF SEVIER )

16
17

I, JEFF JACOBSEN, having been first duly sworn, depose and
state as follows:

18
·19

Civil No. 7928

JEFF JACOBSEN,

13
14

1.

On January 7, 1981, I was present in the Sanpete County

Courthouse in Manti, Utah, for approximately 20 minutes •

.20

2.

During my brief presence there, I heard the Honorable Don

21

v.

22

the defendant.

23

not present at that time.

Tibbs call up the case of Nelson vs. Jacobsen, in which I am

24
25

3.

28

Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. K. L. Mciff, was

I heard the Honorable Don v. Tibbs state that he intended

to set the case for a hearing on January 21, 1981, at 10:00 a.m.

26
27

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF
JACOBSEN

4.

After stating the date and time for the hearing on my

case, the Court immediately proceeded to address other cases, and
thought that my further attendance in court was unnecessary.

29
30

5.

As a result, I left the courtroom immediately.

6.

From January 7, 1981 to January 21, 1981, I did not con-

31

tact any attorney regarding my case.

32

/////
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1

2

7.

Substantially prior to January 7, 1981, I had an informal

conversation with Mr. R. Don Brown regarding the merits of my de-

3

fense in plaintiff Brett Nelson's action against me.

4

of my conversation with Mr. R. Don Brown, my former attorney,

At the time

5

David Brown, failed and refused to provide me with copies of the

6

relevant documents and materials from my file in his possession,

7

and therefore, Mr. R. Don Brown and I could not conduct our conver-

8

sation with reference to any specific material or documents in-

9

valved in this case.

10
11

8.

On January 19, 1981, I received a notice from the Court

which informed me that I would have to be prepared to go to trial

12

on this case on January 21, 1981.

13

cation I had that I was required to prepare for a trial rather

14

than a hearing on this case.

15

16

9.

This notice was the first indi-

Partly as a result of my confusion, I called the trial

court executive to determine if I, in fact, was required to prepare

17

for a trial rather than a hearing.

18

advised me that trial was, in fact, scheduled for January 21, 1981.

The trial court executive

19

The trial court executive asked me if I had an attorney, to which

20

question I replied that I did not.

21

about the hazards or difficulties of proceeding without counsel.

22

10.

At no time did she caution me

In fact, at no point during the course of these proceed-

23

ings was I ever informed of the hazards of proceeding without

24

counsel.

Moreover, I never received any notice from plaintiff

25

that I was required to appoint counsel after David Brown had

26

ceased acting as my attorney, and at no point in these proceedings

27

was I ever informed that if I needed more time, or otherwise re-

28

quested a continuance, the Court would grant the same and would

29

allow me more time and a complete opportunity to prepare for

30

trial.

31
32

11.

have never had any training whatsoever in the law in

general, or courtroom procedures in particular ..

-2-

-T'l-
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1

DATED this

l.

:2¢)

day of March, 1981.

2

3

;-----JE'Fi'/dACOBSEN

I

4

\_/

--

' t,'

~-

5
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

6

7

,~->-day

of March,

1981.

8
9

NOTARY JiUBL7i"e

~o

J.l.

My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

l.2
l.3
z~

:;:~
ffi~

ti~

a.S
ttl~

",

'.

l.4
15
16

~~
_, z

17

g~

18

;~~

0
:z: ~

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

19

the above and foregoing Affidavit to Mr. K. L. Mc!ff, Attorney

20

for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701,

21

postage prepaid, this ~day of March, 1981.

22

23
24
25

26
27

28

29
30

31

32
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RECEIVED
JUq - 1981
HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN
K. L. McIFF
JACKSON, MCIFF & MOWER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone:
896-5441

SO:VIER COU.'ilY

R:cE1vrn r:o. YJ 5b
1579

r;ov

-1 PM 2 52

DEVON POULSON. CLE~K
BY ~J:MrOEPUTY

0'.~

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRETT W. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 8256

BRENDA LEE NELSON,
Defendant.

-..\.

This cause came on regularly for hearing on the ~

day of

.L
\)~<I\,~\./ ,

1979, before the Court sitting without a

jury, The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Judge,
presiding.

It satisfactorily appearing to the Court that good

cause had been shown for waiving the 90-day waiting period of
time between the filing of the complaint and the hearing of the
action as provided by Section 30-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
it further appearing that Defendant made, executed and signed
a certain Stipulation, General Appearance, Waiver and Consent

filed herein, in and by which she entered her voluntary and general
appearance in this action, subjected herself to the jurisdiction

of the Court, agreed to receipt of a copy of the complaint, waived
her right and time to contest said action, to answer or otherwise

plead to the Complaint, and no additional time having been
granted her in which to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint,

and the Plaintiff and his counsel, K. L. Mciff, of Jackson, Mciff
and Mower, appearing in person, and the Defendant not appearing
in person or by counsel, and the Court having heard the evidence

offered by the Plaintiff duly admitted herein in support of his
MATTSSON. JACKSON & MCIFF
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
RICHFIEl...D, UTAH 114701

w 53S-
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-2complaint, and being fully advised in the premises, and having
filed herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore

existing between the Plaintiff, Brett

w.

Nelson, and the Defen-

dant, Brenda Lee Nelson, be and the same hereby are wholly dissolved and the parties freed from the obligations thereof.
2.

Neither party is awarded alimony or child support.

3.

Each party is awarded such property as each had

prior to contracting the marriage.
4.

Each party is awarded such property as each now

has in his or her respective name and particularly plaintiff is
awarded whatever interest the parties have in the certain parcel
of property standing in the name of Brett W. Nelson and William
B. Nelson located in Salina, Utah and described as follows,
to-wit:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3,
Block 8, Plat A, Salina City Survey, Thence
South 127.5 feet, Thence West 214.S feet to
the West line of lot, Thence North 127.5 feet,
Thence East 214.5 feet to point of beginning.
Containing 0.57 acres.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded a certain motorcycle and

snowmobile and a certain horse, and the parties otherwise are
awarded their own personal effects, belongings and paraphernalia.
6.

The parties are ordered to execute such instrwnent

of conveyance, assignment or transfer as may be required to give
force and effect to the terms of the preceeding paragraph.
7.

Each party is ordered to pay any debts or obliga-

tions which he or she has incurred.

Plaintiff is ordered to

satisfy current utility bills.
8.

Defendant is restored to her maiden name of Brenda

Lee Winn, there being no children born as issue of the marriage
and no reason for Defendant to retain Plaintiff's surname.

W5~6
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I

-39.

Each party is ordered to pay his own court costs

and attorney's fees incurred by him or her in the instant proceedings.

10.

The Court hereby approves that certain Stipulation

executed and acknowledged by the parties on or about the 25th
day of September, 1979.
11.

This Decree is and shall be an interlocutory

decree and.shall not became final until three months from the
date of filing.
DATED this

..3j

~

.

,---aay-of-October, 1979.

~~BS

~------~OGE

-..........

ATTEST:

BY.lU.t~d. ~
DEPUTY CLERl<

~~!~ ~f s~~~~ } •

I, D• Von Poul10n, Oerl in end fw the County of S.vfep.

••-Officio Clerk or the DiJtrid Court of .... Sirlh J1,1dicial
Di1trid in and for Se¥ier County. St1te of Ut1h, do hel'tlby
certify fhet the foNgoing i1 e fuU, tn..e end col"Nef copy

H

of tho o•;g;"J.N~L- " / .,,0.-~
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